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The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
was announced by Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich and
Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown on March 24, 1993 to
report on the following questions:
1.  What (if any) new methods or institutions should be
encouraged, or required, to enhance work-place productivity
through labor-management cooperation and employee
participation?
2.  What (if any) changes should be made in the present
legal framework and practices of collective bargaining to
enhance cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and
reduce conflict and delay?
3.  What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent
to which work-place problems are directly resolved by the
parties themselves, rather than through recourse to state
and federal courts and government regulatory bodies?"
On June 2, 1994 the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce
released the Fact Finding Report of the Commission  and an
Executive Summary.
After release of the Fact Finding Report, the Commission
consulted widely through public hearings, working parties
comprised of several members of the Commission, and it
received a variety of views in correspondence, studies and
articles from representatives of business groups, labor
organizations, professional associations, academics, women’s
organizations, civil rights and other interested groups, and
individuals.  This material is included in the public record
of the Commission which was closed on November 14, 1994 by
notice in the Federal Register.  By this consultative
process the Commission has sought to receive the widest
possible comments on its Fact Finding Report as well as
proposals for its conclusions and recommendations for this,
its final report.
The Commission held four additional national hearings after
the issuance of its Fact Finding Report in Washington, D.C.,
making a total of 21 public hearings, including the 11
national and six public hearings in various cities around
the country held previously.  In the four most recent public
hearings, the Commission followed the practices developed in
It’s regional hearings to encourage representatives of
organizations or individuals to volunteer to make
4presentations or to file written statements, should adequate
time for all not be available.  The agenda of each of these
four sessions and a listing of those who testified and their
affiliations are presented in Appendix B.
The Commission appreciates the assistance of the various
organizations and individuals that helped to organize and
make presentations to the Commission and it’s working
parties.
A total of 57 persons testified before the Commission in its
four hearings in July to September 1994, making a total of
411 witnesses in the 21 public hearings.
The transcripts of the four hearings after the Fact Finding
report run to 823 pages, making a total of 4,681 pages for
all public hearings before the Commission.
The Commission has received since May 1994 a number of
studies and presentations outside of public hearings that
provide additional information to its fact-finding phase.
More than 160 statements have been received since the Fact
Finding Report that have been entered in the public record
of the Commission.  Among these items are the following:
(1)  United States General Accounting Office, Workplace
Regulations, Information on Selected Employer and Union
Experiences, Vols. I and II, June 1994.
(2)  Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., Report on the
IRC Survey of Employee Involvement, August 1994, and Results
of the ORC Survey on the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) in Employment Related Disputes, November
1994.
(3)  Princeton Survey  Research Associates, Worker
Representation and Participation Survey, Top-Line Results,
October, 1994.
(4)  U.S. Department of Labor, Report on the American
Workforce, 1994; Women’s Bureau, Working Women Count, A
Report to the Nation, 1994.
(5)  American Civil Liberties Union, The Private Arbitration
of Employment Disputes, November 1994.
A working party of the Commission has continued to meet with
a designated committee of the Small Business Council of the
Chamber of Commerce to receive views and perspectives on the
Fact Finding Report.  Another working party met with
5representatives of ten organizations reflecting the
interests of low-wage workers and received a statement of
potential Administrative and Regulatory Initiatives to
Protect Contingent Workers, October 1994.
A further working party of the Commission met on several
occasions to receive the further views of a group of women’s
organizations that had also testified before the
Commission.  Representatives of labor and management
organizations under the Railway Labor Act have met on
occasions with still another working party of the
Commission.  Meetings have also been held with a number of
representatives of the civil rights community.
The Chair of the Commission had held a series of meetings
with the Enforcement Council of the Department of Labor and
a number of its component agencies to secure data on
staffing, and on the flow and volume of investigations,
complaints, cases and litigation in the administration of
employment laws within the purview of these agencies with
reference to the third mission statement of the Commission.
 The National Labor Relations Board and its General Counsel
has provided similar data.  Discussions have been held also
with the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the EEOC ADR Task Force.  The cooperation of
these agencies is appreciated.
The Commission has received a further letter from the
Republican members of the House Committee on  Education and
Labor dated September 29, 1994.  (See p. 111, note 5, of the
Fact Finding Report for reference to the first letter.)
The Commission deliberated on all the above information from
a variety of perspectives, the Commission reached broad
agreement on the issues it was charged to address.  A
separate perspective by Commissioner Fraser on some aspects
of employee involvement is included in Section II.
This report of the Commission is focused on the three
questions of its Mission Statement, considering each
question separately but also recognizing that these issues
and the Commission’s recommendations constitute a highly
interdependent whole.
In making its legislative recommendations, the Commission
has not proposed explicit statutory language.  Similarly, in
recommendations to administrative agencies and to private
parties it has proposed specific approaches rather than the
language of a regulation.
6A number of more specialized issues were raised in testimony
and statements to the Commission that it has not had the
time nor specialized information to consider fully. These
are significant issues to the workers and managers involved
and deserve more detailed attention and conclusions than the
Commission has had the time or resources to provide.  Among
these questions are the status of agricultural workers under
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and the system
of labor-management relations in the building and
construction industry under these statutes and subsequent
NLRB and court decisions.  Further, the Commission has
considered only in Section VII some of the issues raised by
worker-management relations in a few types of relationships
among those popularly designated as contingent.  The
Commission reports this unfinished business that deserves
further and ongoing consideration.
The Commission has sought the views of a wide range of
employers and employer associations, representatives of
unions, professional associations, women’s groups, civil
rights organizations and academics regarding how to deal
with the problems and challenges of the modern workplace.
 In addition, the Commission believes it is also significant
to hear how workers themselves and their supervisors view
their workplace beyond the reports of their attitudes from
managers or unions.  Thus, the Commission welcomes the
findings of the Worker Representation and Participation
Survey.  This survey provides a detailed and in-depth
analysis of workplace practices and the attitudes and views
in workplaces on many issues pertinent to the Commission’s
charges.  Appendix A presents a brief summary of the survey
procedures and highlights of its findings.
The Department of Commerce provided assistance to the
Commission through Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Everett Ehrlich.  Within the Department of Labor, Roland
Droitsch, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy and
Budget, coordinated a portion of the Commission’s work.
 Assistance was also provided by Seth Harris, Executive
Director of the Department’s Enforcement Council, on matters
related to this area.  Legal research support was given to
the Commission by Andrew Levin and Janet Herold.  The
Commission received comprehensive administrative and related
support from staff of the Office of Small Business and
Minority Affairs.  Ms. Artrella Mack and Mrs. Betty Cooper-
Gibson provided effective service in the technical
preparation of this report.  The Commission is deeply
appreciative.
7Report and Recommendations:  Executive Summary
The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
was appointed by Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and
Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich to address three
questions:
1.  What (if any) new methods or institutions should be
encouraged, or required, to enhance work-place productivity
through labor-management cooperation and employee
participation?
2.  What (if any) changes should be made in the present
legal framework and practices of collective bargaining to
enhance cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and
reduce conflict and delay?
3.  What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent
to which work-place problems are directly resolved by the
parties themselves, rather than through recourse to state
and federal courts and governmental bodies?"
Over its twenty months of work, the Commission heard
testimony and evaluated the experiences of many employers
and employees, and received advice for answering its charge
from many groups and individuals.  This testimony, and
various survey and other evidence, guides the
recommendations and suggestions that we offer to the
Secretaries, and to the nation.
As reported in the Commission's May 1994 Fact-Finding
Report, there is a solid base of experience on which to
build more cooperative and productive workplace relations in
the United States -- the innovative partnerships in
collective bargaining and the array of employee involvement
programs operating in many workplaces across the country.
There are also disconcerting patterns -- increased earning
inequality, difficulties for contingent workers, increased
litigation, rigid and complex regulations, and conflict in
union organizing campaigns.
Our recommendations build on the positive experiences with
productive and cooperative worker-management relations,
support their adoption in additional employment settings,
and encourage further experimentation and learning.  At the
same time we face squarely and propose remedies for the
problems of too much conflict, litigation, inequality, and
regulatory complexity.
8We take an integrated approach to modernizing American labor
and employment law and administration for the future.  Taken
together, these recommendations give workers and managers
the tools and flexibility to do what they say they want to
do and are capable of doing to improve workplace
performance.  We recommend flexibility in employee
participation while insuring respect for workers' rights to
choose unions, if desired.  We encourage the development and
use of fair systems for resolving disputes quickly closest
to their source without going to court or to a government
agency.  We propose to modernize labor law to deliver
through a prompt and simplified process what the law
promises:  a free choice for workers on whether or not to
join a union of their choosing.  Our proposals define
employees and employers in ways consistent with economic
reality.  We encourage continued learning and dialogue among
private and public sector leaders to improve the quality of
policy making on employment issues.
The Commission could not address all the problems or
proposed solutions presented to us.  This does not imply
that those left out are unimportant or not valid.  Instead,
some need to be left to other groups and to further
discussion.  Moreover, the recommendations we offer here are
presented as starting points for improving the workplace
experiences and results for all Americans.
The full set of recommendations are contained in the
separate sections of this report.  Here we present fifteen
key conclusions and recommendations as they relate to each
of our three charges.
1.   New Methods or Institutions to Enhance Workplace Productivity
The evidence presented to the Commission is overwhelming
that employee participation and labor-management
partnerships are good for workers, firms, and the national
economy.  All parties want to encourage expansion and growth
of these developments.  To do so requires removing the legal
uncertainties affecting some forms of employee participation
while safeguarding and strengthening employees' rights to
choose whether or not they wish to be represented at the
workplace by a union or professional organization.
Accordingly we recommend:
(1)  Clarifying the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and
its interpretation by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to insure nonunion employee participation programs
are not found to be unlawful simply because they involve
9discussion of "terms and conditions" of work or compensation
as long as such discussion is incidental to the broad
purposes of these programs.  At the same time, the
Commission reaffirms the basic principle that these programs
are not a substitute for independent unions.  The law should
continue to make it illegal to set up or operate company-
dominated forms of employee representation.
(2)  Updating the definitions of supervisor and manager to
insure that only those with full supervisory or managerial
authority and responsibility are excluded from coverage of
the law.  We further recommend that no individual or group
of  individuals should be excluded from coverage under the
statute because of participation in joint problem-solving
teams, self-managing work groups, or internal self-
governance or dispute resolution processes.
(3)  Reaffirming and extending protections of individuals
against discrimination for participating in employee
involvement processes and for joining or drawing on the
services of an outside labor or professional organization.
These recommendations are linked to those that follow in
important ways.  In addition to eliminating the legal
uncertainties associated with many of the forms of employee
participation underway today, these changes allow and
encourage use of worker-management participation in applying
government regulations to the workplace and resolving
disputes through private resolution procedures.  Moreover,
these changes remove the threat that workers might lose the
protections of collective bargaining by taking on
supervisory or managerial responsibilities.  These changes,
therefore, should open up workplaces to a variety of new
experiments with employee participation and labor-management
partnerships and bring the benefits of these innovations to
more workers and workplaces.
2.   Changes in Collective Bargaining to Enhance
Cooperation and Reduce Conflict and Delay
The evidence reviewed by the Commission demonstrated
conclusively that current labor law is not achieving its
stated intent of encouraging collective bargaining and
protecting workers' rights to choose whether or not to be
represented at their workplace.  Rectifying this situation
is important to insure that these rights are realized for
the workers who wish to exercise them, to de-escalate
workplace conflicts, and to create an overall climate of
trust and cooperation at the workplace and in the broader
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labor and management community.  Accordingly, the Commission
recommends:
(4)  Providing for prompt elections after the NLRB
determines that sufficient employees have expressed a desire
to be represented by a union.  Such elections should
generally be held within two weeks.  To accomplish this
objective we propose that challenges to bargaining units and
other legal disputes be resolved after the elections are
held.
Beyond the reversal of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lechmere so that employees may have access to union
organizers in privately-owned but publicly-used spaces such
as shopping malls, access questions are best left to the
NLRB.  The Commission urges the Board to strive to afford
employees the most equal and democratic dialogue possible.
(5)  Requiring by statute that the NLRB obtain prompt
injunctions to remedy discriminatory actions against
employees that occur during an organizing campaign or
negotiations for a first contract.
(6)  Assisting employers and newly certified unions in
achieving first contracts through an upgraded dispute
resolution system which provides for mediation and empowers
a tripartite advisory board to use a variety of options to
resolve disputes ranging from self-help (strike or lockout)
to binding arbitration for relatively few disputes.
(7)  Encouraging railroad and airline labor and management
representatives to implement their stated willingness to
seek their own solutions for improving the performance of
collective bargaining in their industries.
These changes are essential to de-escalating the level of
conflict, fear, and delays that now too often surround the
process by which workers decide whether or not to be
represented on their jobs.  We distilled our recommendations
down to these basic and simplified changes in the law and
procedures from an extensive array of proposals offered to
the Commission in this area.  Therefore, it is vitally
important to monitor the effects of these recommendations
over time to see if they are adequate to achieve the goals
stated in our national labor law and shared by the American
public.
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3.   Increase the Extent to which Workplace Problems are Resolved by the Parties.
The Commission's findings and recommendations regarding
workplace regulations, litigation, and dispute resolution
fall into three categories:  (1) encouraging development of
high quality private dispute resolution procedures, (2)
encouraging experimentation with workplace self-regulation
procedures in general and with specific reference to
workplace safety and health,  and (3) protecting the
employment rights and standards of contingent workers.
The Commission endorses and encourages the development of
high quality alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems to
promote fair, speedy, and efficient resolution of workplace
disputes.  These systems must be based on the voluntary
acceptance of the parties involved.  The courts and
regulatory agencies should hold these systems accountable
for meeting high quality standards for fairness, due
process, and accountability to the goals and remedies
established in the relevant law.  The Commission also
encourages experimentation with internal responsibility
systems for adapting workplace regulations to fit different
work settings.  Accordingly, we recommend:
(8)  Encouraging regulatory agencies to expand the use of
negotiated rule making, mediation, and alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures for resolving cases that would
otherwise require formal adjudication by the agency and/or
the courts.
(9)  Encouraging experimentation and use of private dispute
resolution systems that meet high quality standards for
fairness, provided these are not imposed unilaterally by
employers as a condition of employment.
(10) Encouraging individual regulatory agencies (e.g., OSHA,
Wage and Hour Division, EEOC, etc.) to develop guidelines
for internal responsibility systems in which parties at the
workplace are allowed to apply regulations to their
circumstances.
America's workplaces must be made safer and more healthful
and workers' compensation costs need to be reduced.
 Workplace safety and health is an ideal starting point for
experimenting with internal responsibility  systems for
meeting public policy objectives, given the long-standing
and widespread experience with employee participation and
labor-management committees in safety and health matters and
the shared interests all parties have in improving safety
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and health outcomes.  Evidence presented to the Commission
shows that properly structured joint committees and
participation plans can significantly improve safety and
health protection.  Accordingly, we recommend:
(11) Developing safety and health programs in each workplace
that provide for employee participation.  Those workplaces
that demonstrate such a program is in place with a record of
high safety and health performance would receive
preferential status in OSHA's inspection and enforcement
activities.
The growth of various forms of contingent work poses
opportunities for good job matches between workers with
differing labor force attachments and employers needing
flexibility in response to changing market conditions.  At
the same time, some contingent work arrangements relegate
workers to a second class status of low wages, inadequate
fringe benefits, lack of training and, most importantly,
loss of protection of labor and employment laws and
standards.  This is a very complex set of developments for
which adequate data are not yet available to do more than
address the most obvious problems.  Our recommendations are
therefore cautious in this area, recognizing the need to
continue to monitor and evaluate the labor market
experiences of all forms of contingent work and to derive
policy recommendations as these data and analyses become
available.  Accordingly, we recommend:
 (12) Adopting a single definition of employer for all
workplace laws based on the economic realities of the
employment relationship.  Furthermore, we encourage the NLRB
to use its rule-making authority to develop an appropriate
doctrine governing joint employers in settings where the use
of contract arrangements might otherwise serve as a
subterfuge for avoiding collective bargaining or evading
other responsibilities under labor law.
(13) Adopting a single definition of employee for all
workplace laws based on the economic realities of the
employment relationship.  The law should confer independent
contractor status only on those for whom it is appropriate -
- entrepreneurs who bear the risk of loss, serve multiple
clients, hold themselves out to the public as an independent
business, and so forth.  The law should not provide
incentives for misclassification of employees as independent
contractors, which costs federal and state treasuries large
sums in uncollected social security, unemployment, personal
income, and other taxes.
13
Implementing the recommendations in this report would open
up employment policy and practice to a period of
experimentation and opportunities for further learning.  To
channel this learning into constructive policy making we
recommend:
(14) Creating a National Forum on the Workplace involving
leaders of business, labor, women's, and civil rights groups
to continue discussing workplace issues and public policies.
In addition, we recommend establishment of a national Labor-
Management Committee to discuss issues of special concern to
the future of collective bargaining and worker-management
relations.  We encourage development of similar forums in
communities, states, and industries to further promote grass
roots experimentation and learning.
(15)  Improving the data base for policy analysis of
workplace developments, evaluation of labor-management
experiments in the private sector, and for assessment of the
economic condition of contingent workers.  This requires
amalgamation of existing data sets within the NLRB and
Department of Labor, and among these and other agencies as
well as coordination of research on workplace topics for the
National Forum and other interested parties.
The Challenges Ahead
From the views presented to us emerged a vision of the
Workplace of the 21st Century that is shared widely across
all sectors of society and the workforce.  These goals
appear at the end of this Executive Summary.  Achieving some
of them requires updating and modernizing labor and
employment law; others can be addressed through changes in
administrative processes to give more power and flexibility
to the parties  at the workplace to govern their
relationships and solve problems closest to the source.  All
will require leadership and sustained commitment to learning
and experimentation on the part of individual workers and
the labor and management leaders who shape employment
practices.  We urge that progress toward achievement of
these goals be assessed systematically on a continuous basis
and the results shared widely with the American public.
We can summarize the challenges facing America to improve
the quality and performance of workplace relations quite
simply.  They are to sustain the momentum underway in the
most innovative workplaces, to bring these innovations to
and share their benefits among more workers and managers,
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and to overcome the countervailing forces that stand in the
way of achieving the goals of the 21st Century workplace. We
see three such countervailing forces, two of which are
reflected directly in the charges to this Commission and in
our recommendations.
The first of these countervailing forces is the high level
of conflict and tension surrounding the process by which
workers decide whether or not to be represented by a union
for the purpose of collective bargaining.  Our
recommendations should result in a significant de-escalation
of these conflicts and a restoration of workers' promised
rights in this area, and thereby improve the overall climate
for cooperative labor-management relations.
The second countervailing force is the frustration that
managers experience in trying to respond to complex
workplace regulations and mounting litigation, and that
workers experience in trying to enforce their legal rights
on the job.  Our recommendations provide workers and
managers with the tools and flexibility to replace the
command and control system of regulation and the litigious
system for enforcing rights with opportunities for greater
self-governance and private, high quality, dispute
resolution.
The third force limiting the momentum toward higher quality
workplaces was highlighted in our Fact Finding Report but
its solution lies well beyond the mandate of this
Commission.  We refer here to the widening earnings
inequality and stagnant real earnings that have
characterized the American labor market over the past ten to
fifteen years. While the Commission makes no direct
recommendations focused on this serious problem, a number of
our recommendations should contribute to reducing this
growing disparity.  Among these recommendations are our
support for increased training at the workplace; increased
opportunities for employee participation to enhance
productivity, quality, and worker development; protections
against the use of contractors or contingent workers to
evade responsibilities under labor and employment law; and
changes to provide workers the opportunity for
representation and collective bargaining if they want it.
The recommendations of this Report are designed to
contribute to the achievement of the goals and relationships
required for the 21st Century workplace.
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Goals for the 21st Century Workplace
1.  Expand coverage of employee participation and labor-management partnerships to more workers and
more workplaces and to a broader array of decisions.
2.  Provide workers an uncoerced opportunity to choose, or not to choose, a bargaining representative and to
engage in collective bargaining.
3.  Improve resolution of violations of workplace rights.
4.   Decentralize and internalize responsibility for workplace regulations.
5.   Improve workplace safety and health .
6.   Enhance the growth of productivity in the economy as a whole.
7.   Increase training and learning at the workplace and related institutions.
8.   Reduce inequality by raising the earnings and benefits of workers in the lower part of the wage
distribution.
9.  Upgrade the economic position of contingent workers.
10.  Increase dialogue and learning at the national and local levels.
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I.   Introduction:  The Workplace and  Society
1.   SOCIETAL DEMANDS ON THE WORKPLACE
The workplace has become the central institution in American
society.  A higher proportion of the population than ever
before is in the workplace, as women have taken jobs to
support their families as principal breadwinners or as part
of dual-earner households.  Workplaces reflect the racial
and ethnic diversity of the population more than any other
institution.  The workplace distributes earned income to
most of the population.  In contrast with many other
advanced countries, where the state provides benefits for
citizens paid from general taxation, the U.S. relies on
private decision-making in the workplace to furnish a
disparate range of benefits, most notably health insurance
and vacations with pay. The U.S. also places on the
workplace the obligation to provide an increasing list of
individual rights enforceable in the courts.  Americans
spend more time at the workplace than the citizens of any
other advanced country, save for Japan. Far more Americans
work than vote.
Economic Performance.  The workplace is a centerpiece of the
nation's economic performance, concern with productivity,
quality, and competitiveness. Our main national asset is a
skilled and hard-working workforce. In an ever more global
economy, the quality of the workplace affects not only the
individual enterprise and its employees, but also national
economic growth and productivity performance.
Training.  The workplace is also the locus of vital training
of the workforce and even of considerable formal educational
programs, illustrated by instruction in math, language and
basic skills, apprenticeship, military programs, interns and
residents in the medical profession, and executive training.
Continuous learning on the job and in teamwork with
multiple job tasks characterizes our most productive work
environments. This training is often best provided on the
job, learning from peers as needed or in new delivery modes
that enable a self-paced learning such as interactive media.
 Training in health and safety, quality, and problem-solving
are critical for the workplace to fulfill its social role.
 In the world of the future, the significance of training
and education in the workplace may be expected to be even
greater than at present.<Footnote: See, Workforce Training
and Development for U.S. Competitiveness, The Business
Roundtable, August 1993; Labor's Key Role in Training, AFL-
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CIO Report of Training, September 1994.>
New Forms of Work Organization.  As these societal demands
on the workplace increase, a number of changes in the nature
and location of work, and in relations among workers and
supervisors, make the attainment of these objectives more
complex and difficult.  Indeed, the traditional distinctions
between worker and supervisor are often without meaning in
 many current workplaces. New forms of organizing work, new
workplaces (including work at home), new work relations
(including with customers), new work hours, and new legal
forms have emerged and become more common  in which there is
ambiguity and often no clear responsibility for training,
health and safety, benefits, legal obligations, and the
other societal demands on the workplace.<Footnote:
Reflecting the surrounding community, moreover, the
workplace now reports an increased incidence of homicide,
violence, and verbal abuse destructive of morale, quality,
and productivity.  Drug and alcohol abuse also create
problems at work.  One in six violent crimes -- almost a
million a year -- occur at the workplace.  In 1992 more than
500,000 employees were victims of violent crime at their
workplace.>  These new and more diverse relations raise
questions about the definitions of employee and employer,
supervisor and professional used in labor relations and
employment law.
Workplace Regulations.  Starting in the early 1900s, with
concern over accidents, a vastly expanded array of standards
has been required of workplaces by the political process.
The old common law covering worker-management relations has
been replaced in many areas by state and federal regulations
that give workers an increasing body of legal entitlements
and rights enforceable against the employer in the courts
that largely places  obligations on the employer.
Legislation in Democratic and Republican administrations
alike as well as court decisions regulate the terms of
employment in the workplace, and many states have specified
their own rules and definitions.<Footnote: The Commission
facilitated the first comprehensive survey of the vast
complex of legal statutes and regulations and the reactions
of employers and union representatives to the regulations
and to the regulatory and enforcement processes. General
Accounting Office, Workplace Regulation, Information on
Selected Employer and Union Experiences, Vols. I and II.
June 1994. See, Fact Finding Report, pp. 129-133.>
 Some federal interventions have been designed, as in the
case of statutes dealing with discrimination and harassment,
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to change the mores or customs prevailing in many workplaces
apart from providing redress to affected individuals.
One of the earliest pieces of New Deal era legislation was
the Wagner Act (modified by 1947 and 1959 statutes) that
sought to assure workers the right to choose freely whether
or not to join a union and to encourage the practice of
collective bargaining over terms and conditions of
employment. The procedures were designed to ascertain
whether or not workers wanted democratically chosen
representation at the workplace.  It is to be observed that
the labor movement often provided the impetus and political
support for many of the workplace entitlements enacted by
regulatory legislation for all workers. In recent years
civil rights groups, women's  groups, and religious groups
have also played a role in expanding the protection provided
for workers.  At their volition or through collective
bargaining, companies have also introduced numerous policies
designed to improve worker well-being as well as to raise
workplace efficiency. For instance, most large firms now
have employee assistance programs to help employees with
alcohol, drug, mental health or other problems.
The Need for Cooperation.   An increasing number of
employers and unions have found that the best way to compete
in the marketplace and secure both profits for the firm and
good jobs for workers is through cooperative worker-
management relations.  As Americans obtain more education,
and with the changing nature of some work, employers
 increasingly find it appropriate to rearrange
responsibilities and tasks to employees, who work sometimes
as teams and other times as individuals. For their part,
more highly educated employees express greater desire to
participate in workplace decisions and have the knowledge
and competence to undertake more tasks at the workplace. It
is clearer now than in the past that creating value at the
workplace is the joint responsibility of management and
labor.
The Commission also recognizes that there is great diversity
in the seven million workplaces in the country -- variations
by industry, community, number of employees, demographic mix
of workers, and union status, with a correspondingly wide
disparity in relations among workers and management that
ranges from hostility to open collaborative partnerships.
The ability of workplaces to carry out their critical social
and economic functions is, however, diminished by the
continuing conflict that exists in some workplaces between
employees who seek independent representation and to engage
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in collective bargaining and some employers who seek to
prevent this outcome. The polarization between employees and
management in union representation campaigns, and the unfair
labor practices committed in some of these campaigns, poison
the attitudes in many other workplaces and detract from the
attainment of cooperative arrangements and the rational
assessment of workplace problems and mutually beneficial
solutions.
The achievement of prescribed standards of protection and
regulation -- in health and safety at workplaces, freedom
from discrimination or sexual harassment, payment of minimum
wages -- all too often is equally confrontational and
litigious in many workplaces.  Our courts and regulatory
agencies are burdened with employment disputes that would
better be resolved at the workplace. Many workers who lack
the resources to go to court and many firms who fear the
expense of lawsuits do not get the just resolution of
workplace problems that they deserve. Hence, the attention
to improved methods of dispute resolution.
It is time to turn down the decibel count, the adversarial
and hostility quotient that all too often mars discussion of
worker-management relations. We must -come and reason
together- to devise the best ways to assure that workers
have their legislatively proscribed and socially agreed upon
rights and employment norms, without burdening the economy
with excessive litigation and extended administrative
proceedings. We must develop institutions and practices that
will allow employees and firms to cooperate at the workplace
in ways that will contribute optimally to economic growth
and competitive performance and to the fulfillment of social
norms.
The Commission recognizes, of course, that the interests of
workers and management are not identical:   they will differ
in some areas. In a market economy buyers and sellers have
different perspectives on the terms of sale. But there are
numerous ways to resolve disputes cooperatively, or, if need
be, through limited conflict such as strikes or lockouts
rather than open warfare. And there are many leaders in
business and in the labor movement to provide advice and
role models for dealing with disagreements by  finding
efficacious solutions to problems.
In Chapter I of its Fact Finding Report, the Commission
documented places in which the American economy has not
successfully met the challenge of recent economic
developments -- the rise in income inequality and fall in
earnings for many less skilled workers that threatens to
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turn a predominantly middle-class society into a two-tier
society; sluggish growth in productivity outside of
manufacturing; the inability of the job market to offer many
employees work that pays more than crime -- as well as areas
where we have outperformed other advanced nations. To
improve our national economic performance in the areas in
which we have problems and to maintain into the 21st century
our success in the areas in which we have done well requires
that we modernize our labor-management relations, bringing
the best practices to more and more firms and workers.
The workplaces that we have inherited are far too
adversarial in tone and substance for the good of the
American economy.  Changes must be made in the way firms,
employees, and unions interact, and in workplace laws and
regulations, to enable them to carry out successfully the
vital tasks society places on them.
This Report specifies some of those changes in the form of
suggestions and recommendations. They are a starting point
on a necessary road to adjusting the workplace to the
realities of a changing social and economic environment and
to the vision of a better future.  The future of the
American economy and society is vitally dependent on the
American workplace. It is important that we begin the task
of making the workplace a better and more productive place
for firms and employees alike.
2.   GOALS FOR THE 21st CENTURY AMERICAN WORKPLACE
Given the changing role of the workplace in society, and the
views expressed to the Commission by managers, employees,
union leaders, and other experts, we believe it is essential
to state a vision and a set of goals for the workplace of
the future.  We present ten integrated objectives that,
taken together, position the American workforce and the
economy for the 21st Century.
(1) Expand coverage of employee participation and labor-
management partnerships to more workers, more workplaces,
and to more issues and decisions.
Employee participation and labor-management partnerships are
essential to improved productivity, enhanced quality and
economic performance, and an increased voice and higher
living standards for American workers.  It is in the
national interest to see participation and partnerships
sustained and expanded to cover a larger proportion of the
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American workforce and workplaces, and to address the full
range of issues critical to improving workplace performance
and advancing workers -  economic positions and quality of
working lives.  It is also in the national interest to
experiment with alternative forms of participation and
cooperative labor-management relations to meet workers -
varied needs and circumstances.
 Provide workers with a readily accessible opportunity to
choose, or not to choose, union representation  and to
engage in collective bargaining.
Reduced hostility is essential in the full process -- from
initial expression of interest to the signing of a first
agreement --  if workers are to have a free and accessible
choice about whether or not to be represented by a union, so
that those who want collective bargaining can exercise that
right and so that managers do not feel they are under attack
whenever employees decide union representation is in their
best interest.
(3) Improve resolution of disputes about workplace rights.
All American workers need to achieve the promised objectives
of freedom from discrimination, unfair treatment, and
fulfillment of their statutory rights.
All those who feel they have been unjustly treated should
have access to rapid resolution processes that are
inexpensive, fair, and that serve as effective deterrents to
unfair behavior or employment practices.
(4)  Decentralize and internalize responsibility for
workplace regulations.
Command and control- government regulations at the
workplace should be reduced in favor of greater internal
responsibility systems and private resolution of disputes by
firms and workers themselves, with the assistance of
neutrals when necessary.  Regulatory resources could then be
focused on the more serious miscreants and on encouragement
of work-level dispute resolution.
(5)  Improve workplace safety and health.
America's workplaces must be made safer, reducing workers -
injury and occupational disease and workers -  compensation
costs.  Each workplace must be encouraged to develop an
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appropriate system to improve safety and health.  Regulatory
bodies should help in the process and provide workers and
firms with advanced scientific knowledge on  safety and
health.  The most dangerous worksites should be targeted for
particular attention.
(6) Enhance the growth of productivity in the economy as a
whole.
It is critical for the well-being of the American people
that productivity grow at a sufficiently fast pace to
improve the living standards of all citizens.  Labor-
management relation’s policies and practices should
contribute to this goal.
(7)  Increase training and learning at the workplace and in
related institutions.
Additional training and opportunities for learning on-the-
job are needed to enhance the performance of enterprises,
improve the rate of productivity growth, and permit higher
wages and benefits. Workers in the service sector need
particular attention since this sector has experienced a
slow rate of productivity growth, and it employs the largest
number of low-skilled young workers with inadequate
education and access to training opportunities.
(8)  Reduce inequality that has increased in the American
labor market over the past ten to fifteen years by raising
the earnings and benefits of workers in the lower part of
the wage distribution.
A number of recommendations of the Commission should make a
contribution toward the goal of reducing growing earnings
disparities -- in particular the emphasis on training,
employee participation to enhance worker development,
productivity and quality, and, if workers choose, the
opportunity for representation and collective bargaining.
(9)  Upgrade the economic position of contingent workers.
A variety of arrangements are required to assist  low-wage
workers in temporary or contingent employment relationships
to receive the protections of labor relations and employment
laws.  The country needs to arrest the growing disparity
between the labor conditions of full-time workers in stable
career-oriented jobs and those of contingent workers who
desire but are not able to obtain these types of jobs,
23
earnings and benefits.
(10)  Increase dialogue at the national level and local
level.
Arrangements need to be developed for regular dialogue among
the leaders of business, labor, civil rights and women's
organizations, and the government.  In a dynamic market
economy, workplace problems and solutions continually
change, and it is important for national, sectoral and local
leaders to monitor these changes to learn systematically
from experience, and quickly to develop strategies and
policies that meet new challenges at the workplace.
We now turn our attention to the changes in public policy
and private practice that are needed if we are to achieve
the goals for the workplace of the 21st century.
24
II.  Employee Involvement
1.   INTRODUCTION
The Commission's Fact Finding Report noted (pp. 29-61) that
a variety of employee participation processes and committees
have been established in America's workplaces.  Many larger
firms report using some form of employee participation in
their organizations.  Information received by the Commission
since the Report confirms the diffusion of employee
involvement.  Fifty-two percent of employees in the
Workplace Representation and Participation Survey reported
that some form of employee participation program operates in
their workplace and 31 percent indicate that they
participate in an employee involvement program.
Employee involvement programs have diverse forms, ranging
from teams that deal with specific problems for short
periods to groups that meet for more extended periods.  Many
employers and union leaders testified before the Commission
that the programs enhance productivity, though their
effectiveness surely differs in different settings.  Thirty-
two percent of workers involved in these programs view them
as very effective while 55 percent view them as somewhat
effective.  Seventy-nine percent report that the programs
have given them greater say in their jobs.  By a two-to-one
majority, employees at workplaces without employee
involvement programs say they would like a program of this
sort at their workplace.
On the basis of the evidence, the Commission believes that
it is in the national interest to promote expansion of
employee participation in a variety of forms provided it
does not impede employee choice of whether or not to be
represented by an independent labor organization.  At its
best, employee involvement makes industry more productive
and improves the working lives of employees.
The evidence presented also shows that as practiced today
some employee participation programs may be in violation of
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.  The problem is that some
programs designed to improve productivity and quality also
end up discussing interrelated issues of working conditions
and of how to share the gains produced by employee
involvement.  A related problem is that some programs blur
the traditional distinction between supervisors or managers
and workers, raising questions about the coverage of
employees under the NLRA.  Indicative of the extent of this
blurring of traditional boss/worker lines, in the Workplace
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Representation and Participation Survey 35 percent of
workers said they perform some supervisory duties as an
official part of their job.
In view of the role of employee involvement plans in
American industry, the Commission supports some
clarification of Section 8(a)(2) so that employee
involvement programs such as those relating to production,
quality, safety and health, training or voluntary dispute
resolution are legal as long as they do not allow for a
rebirth of the company unions the section was designed to
outlaw.  We want workers and managers participating in these
programs to be able to do so effectively, with gains for
both, without skirting or breaking the law.
In light of the increased supervisory and managerial role of
employees in American industry, the Commission also supports
reducing the exclusion of supervisors and managers from the
coverage and protection of the NLRA.  We want to guarantee
that workers engaged in collective bargaining or considering
unionization do not lose the protection of the law for their
union activity because of their involvement in supervisory
or managerial activities.
These considerations motivate the recommendations in this
section.
 2.  RECOMMENDATIONS
 (1) Facilitate the Growth of Employee Involvement
The Commission recommends that nonunion employee
participation programs should not be unlawful simply because
they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or
compensation where such discussion is incidental to the
broad purposes of these programs.
We believe that programs of the types referrred to above,
which are proliferating in the U.S. today, do not violate
the basic purposes of Section 8(a)(2).  Therefore we
recommend that Congress clarify Section 8(a)(2) and that the
NLRB interpret it in such a way that employee participation
programs operating in this fashion are legal.
The Commission is concerned that in encouraging employee
participation in nonunion settings, it does not adversely
affect employees' ability to select union representation, if
they so desire.
Thus, the Commission reaffirms the basic principle that
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employer-sponsored programs should not substitute for
independent unions.  Employee participation programs are a
means for employees to be involved in some workplace issues.
 They are not a form of independent representation for
employees, and thus should not be legally permitted to deal
with the full scope of issues normally covered by collective
bargaining. <Footnote:   The law should continue to prohibit
commmittees like the one Polaroid Corp. disbanded in June,
l992 after the Labor Department suggested that it was -labor
organization.-  Such joint groups are representative in
character and count among their primary functions handling
employee grievances and advising senior management about
pay, work rules and benefits.  They so well beyond
incidental involvement in issues traditionally reserved to
independent labor organizations.  See Fact Finding Report,
pp. 42, 60>
.
(2)  Continue to Ban Company Unions
The law should continue to prohibit companies from setting
up company dominated labor organizations.  It should be an
unfair labor practice under NLRA Section 8(a)(1) for an
employer to establish a new participation program or to use
or manipulate an existing one with the purpose of
frustrating employee efforts to obtain independent
representation.
We believe this recommendation is consistent with current
law.<Footnote: See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405
(1964).>
Employees involved in employee participation committees or
processes should have the same protections in law from
retaliation for expressing their opinions on workplace
issues as workers involved in union activity under the NLRA.
 They should have the right to communicate their views to
employers or co-workers  and be able to seek outside
expertise on issues, if they so desire.  The Commission
believes that current law provides protection against
reprisals for such -concerted activities for the purpose of
... mutual aid or protection-, as the NLRA calls
it.<Footnote: See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9 (1962).> But to the extent that doubts exist about its
scope, the Commission believes this protection should cover
a worker's activities related to an employee participation
program.
Employee involvement systems are somewhat more frequent
under collective  bargaining than in other settings.  In the
Workplace Representation and Participation Survey,  33
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percent of unionized employees reported that they were
involved in a participation program, compared to 28 percent
of nonunion employees.  In its Fact Finding phase, the
Commission heard testimony that employee participation is
most effective in a union setting when union and management
work together as joint partners.  All who testified agreed
that it is important for union and management
representatives to  continue to work together in this
fashion to extend the scope, coverage, and effectiveness of
employee participation in the future.
In view of this experience, in organized workplaces it is
important that employers not be permitted to bypass
collective bargaining representatives to  institute employee
involvement committees or processes.   Issues normally dealt
with in collective bargaining should not be discussed in
employee involvement programs without the consent of the
elected labor organization.  The Commission recommends that
it should be an unfair labor practice under NLRA Section
8(a)(1) for an employer to bypass the union or to introduce
or manipulate an employee participation program to subvert
the collective bargaining process.  We believe this
recommendation is consistent with current law.
The recommendations clarifying Section 8(a)(2), the
distinction between employee involvement programs and
unions, the protections afforded workers in participation
programs, and the functions of these programs compared to
unions will by themselves improve the climate for these
programs to proliferate.  The safeguards against company-
dominated unions under Section 8(a)(2), and the
recommendations obtained in Section III for reducing
conflict and delay in establishing unions where employees so
desire should mutually reinforce one another, so that the
law eases the creation of employee involvement programs
without harming employee freedom to unionize.  This balance
is essential.
(3)  Reduce the Scope of the Supervisory and Managerial
Exclusions
Congress should simplify and restrict the supervisory and
managerial employee exclusions of the NLRA to ensure that
the vast numbers of professionals and other workers who wish
to participate in decision-making at work are not stripped
of their right to do so through collective bargaining if
they so choose.
Each of the two exclusions embodies a core principle that
must be preserved.  Employees whose primary function is to
28
carry out the employer's labor relations policy by hiring,
firing, and disciplining employees are clearly supervisors
and should continue to be excluded from the Act.  Employees
near the top of the firm's managerial structure who have
substantial, individual discretion to set major company
policy and whose primary function is to develop such policy
are clearly managerial employees and should also continue to
be excluded.
These two principles should be incorporated into a single,
simplified -managerial employee- definition that includes
statutory supervisors and managers but not (1) members of
work teams and joint committees to whom managerial and/or
personnel decision-making authority is delegated or (2)
professionals and para-professionals who direct their less
skilled co-workers.
One aspect of employee involvement is the diffusion of
supervisory and managerial decision-making power throughout
the workforce.  Both work teams and joint committees often
decide matters traditionally left to full-time supervisors
or managers.  The Commission believes that this development
should be encouraged.
Unfortunately, the labor law has not accommodated this
change in the real world of work.  The law continues to draw
rigid distinctions between supervisors and managers on the
one hand, and -employees- covered by the NLRA on the other.
 Supreme Court jurisprudence has contributed to this
 problem.<Footnote: See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974); NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980);
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S.Ct.
1778 (1994).>
The Court created the managerial employee exclusion, which
is not found in the Act itself, and applied it not only to
senior managers but also to buyers of parts and materials.
<Footnote: NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (l974>
Then, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, <Footnote: 44 U.S. 672,
(l980)>  the Court greatly expanded the scope of this
managerial employee exclusion by holding that the faculty of
Yeshiva University  could not be an appropriate bargaining
unit because the professors (or at least the bulk of them
who participated in faculty decisions) were all managers.
 Since, like many university and college faculties, they
voted on matters such as curriculum, class size, and
academic standards, the professors exercised -authority
which in any other context unquestionably would be manageri
al.-  <Footnote:444 U.S. at 686.> The case means that rank
and file employees who participate in work teams or joint
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committees can lose their right to form an independent
union.  Indeed, the NLRB interpreted Yeshiva so as to strip
union members of their collective bargaining rights þ and
their union because they negotiated an employee
participation agreement with their employer.
<Footnote:College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 265
N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).>
More recently, in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America, <Footnote:__ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1778 (1994).> the
Supreme Court expanded the statute's supervisory employee
exclusion.  The Court effectively read out of the Act a
requirement that, in order to be deemed a supervisor, an
employee must carry out one of several functions -in the
interest of the employer.-  The NLRB had used the statute's
-in the interest of the employer- test to separate out
workers who direct others based on superior skill,
experience and the like from true supervisors those whose
main function is to direct the work of others (or hire,
fire, and so forth) for the employer. The Court declared
that all -acts within the scope of employment or on the
authorized business of the employer are in the interest of
the employer.- <Footnote: 114 S.Ct. at 1782.> In practice,
this could mean that any employee who responsibly directs
co-workers is a supervisor denied protection of the labor
law.
The Health Care case could adversely affect professionals in
particular. Congress has specified that professionals are to
enjoy the protections of the NLRA. Yet, as Judge Richard
Posner has pointed out, -most professionals have some
supervisory responsibilities in the sense of directing
another's work þ the lawyer his secretary, the teacher his
teacher's aide, the doctor his nurses, the registered nurse
her nurse's aide, and so on..-  <Footnote:NLRB v. Res-Care,
Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983).>  In the Supreme
Court's view, incidental direction of co-workers would
appear to make one a -supervisor- who lacks collective
bargaining rights.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, -
[i]f any person who may use independent judgment to assign
tasks to others or direct their work is a supervisor, then
few professionals employed by organizations subject to the
Act will receive its protections.-<Footnote:114 U.S. at
1792-93.>
These Supreme Court cases fail to take into account the
degree to which supervisory and managerial tasks have been
diffused throughout the workforce in many American firms.
 As  a result of the Court's interpretations, thousands of
rank-and-file employees have lost or may lose their
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collective bargaining rights.  The Commission believes the
law can and should accommodate the desires of professionals
and other employees to participate at work þ whether they
desire to do so via independent representation or otherwise.
<Footnote: The Commission also advocates relaxing the
restrictions placed on the ability of plant guards to
participate in collective bargaining by Section 9(b)(3) of
the NLRA, which precludes guards or a local union of guards
from affiliating -directly or indirectly with an
organization which admits to membership ... employees other
than guards.-  While separate bargaining units and locals
are appropriate, preventing affiliation with an established
international union or federation of unions is an
unnecessary limitation.
Another problem is that the scope of the -guard- definition
has grown in NLRB jurisprudence over the years, to the point
that elevator operators, concierges, and doormen are often
held to be guards.>
( 4)  Authorize Pre-hire Agreements
When an employer wants to move or open new operations, it
should be allowed to negotiate a contract with a union
interested in representing those who will work at the new
operations, as long as the negotiations are conducted at
arm's length.  The employer should be allowed to recognize
the union.  In order to ensure that the employees covered
under the new agreement support it, the union should be
required to demonstrate majority support by the end of the
first year of the new operations, or else the agreement and
the union's status as representative would expire at that
time.  The parties would be allowed to verify the union's
majority status either by card check or representation
 election.  The agreement should not serve as a contract
bar.
Section 8(a)(2) continues to serve the vital function of
precluding -sweetheart- deals between employers and unions
that do not represent a majority of employees.  Such deals
frustrate employee free choice by taking out of workers'
hands the decision about whether to have independent
representation.  The policy of generally disallowing
employer recognition and support of non-majority unions
remains valid.
However, the Commission is concerned that this policy may
operate in an unduly mechanical way.  The problem is that
the rule against employer support of non-majority unions
limits the ability of an employer and a union to cooperate
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when the employer plans to move or open new operations.  The
occasion of new or relocated operations often presents an
opportunity for innovative cooperation between employers and
unions around issues of work organization, employee
compensation and productive efficiency.
Such agreements not only improve labor-management relations,
they also help all of us by facilitating the diffusion of
high-performance work techniques.  In addition, advance
negotiations can increase rather than decrease the quality
of employee choice about collective bargaining.  In effect,
a pre-negotiated contract between the employer and an
independent union gives the employees an opportunity to try
out the union's representation before voting on whether to
accept or reject it.
Unfortunately, this kind of cooperative advance planning is
severely restricted by Section 8(a)(2).  The NLRB has
interpreted the measure as prohibiting employer recognition
of a union as part of prospective bargaining in most
circumstances.  What is more, the Board's interpretation
forbids advance negotiation of contract terms
altogether even without recognition if the employer and
union have no previous relationship.<Footnote: Majestic
Weaving Co. of N.Y., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).>  We urge the
Board to reconsider its approach here, and we recommend that
Congress address this issue as part of its next effort to
reform our labor laws.
 3.  CONCLUSION
 Employee participation will have to expand to more
workplaces if the American economy is to be competitive at
high standards of living in the 21st century.  Participation
must also expand to include more workers and a broader array
of issues if it is to meet the expectations and address the
 vital concerns of the nation's work force.  The
recommendations presented in this section could modernize
labor law to encourage continued innovation in employee
participation.
While the proposals in this Section and those that follow
are needed in their own right, they are also closely
interrelated.  This is because the increased flexibility for
employee participation proposed here poses both new risks
and new opportunities for workers and employers.  The risks
of reducing employee opportunity to choose independent
representation are addressed by the changes presented in
Section III.  The increased flexibility for employee
participation should be accompanied by corresponding changes
in the law needed to ensure that workers have ready access
32
to independent representation and collective bargaining.
Expanding the issues open to employee participation also
opens possibilities for greater experimentation with
employee involvement in alternative dispute resolution and
self-governance processes on issues now subject to -command
and control- regulation and court litigation.  We turn,
then, to these issues.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS A. FRASER
 Section 8(a)(2) stands as a bulwark against forms of
representation which are inherently illegitimate because
they deny workers the right to a voice through the
independent representatives of their own choosing and put
the employer on -both sides of the table,- to quote Senator
Wagner's words from l935.*  Thus, I place great importance
on the fact that the Commission has not proposed any
wholesale revision or exemption to Section 8(a)(2).
Nonetheless, I cannot join the majority's recommendation
that -Congress clarify Section 8(a)(2)- by somehow providing
that -employee participation programs should not be unlawful
simply because they involve discussion of terms and
conditions of work or compensation where such discussion is
incidental to the broad purposes of these program.-
The prudent course would be to allow the administrative and
judicial processes to address the issue of -incidental
discussion- in the first instance.  If problems were to
develop if, in fact, the law in practice were shown to
substantially interfere with the kind of incidental
discussions the majority seeks to protect þ Congress could
then take up the subject against a far clearer legal and
factual background.
In dissenting from the recommendation to amend Section
8(a)(2), I wish to make clear that I do not minimize the
value of encouraging -employee participation- and -labor-
management cooperation.-  But to my mind, the kind of -
participation- and -cooperation- that should be encouraged
is democratic participation and cooperation between equals.
 I agree with Peter Pestillo, the Executive Vice President
of Ford Motor Company, that -A strong alliance requires two
strong members.  There should be no quibbling about that.-
 And I likewise agree with Morton Bahr, the President of the
Communication Workers of America, that:
to effectively participate in workplace decision-making,
front-line workers must first have their own organizations,
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educated leadership, and significant resources in order to
have the confidence and preparation to participate as equals
and without fear. {Sept. l5, l993 Tr. at 63}
Because I am deeply committed to the principal of work place
democracy,  I cannot join in any statement that proclaims
that you can have fully effective worker management
cooperation programs without having a truly equal
partnership based upon workers having an independent voice.
 I must therefore dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION OF DOUGLAS A. FRASER
(January 3, 1995)
Section 8(a)(2) stands as a bulwark against forms of
representation which are inherently illegitimate because
they deny workers the right to a voice through the
independent representatives of their own choosing and put
the employer on -both sides of the table,- to quote Senator
Wagner's words from l935.*  Thus, I cannot join in the
majority's recommendation that "Congress clarify Section
8(a)(2)" by somehow providing that "employee participation
programs should not be unlawful simply because they involve
discussion of terms and conditions of work or compensation
where such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of
these programs."
Given the legal and factual uncertainties that exist as to
the scope of 8(a)(2), and the danger that any statutorily-
created exception would be an invitation to abuse, at the
very least the prudent course would be to allow the
administrative and judicial processes to address the issue
of "incidental discussion" in the first instance.  If
problems were to develop -- if, in fact, the law in practice
were shown to substantially interfere with incidental
discussions of terms of employment -- Congress could then
take up the subject against a far clearer legal and factual
background.
In no event, should employer-dominated employee
representation plans be permitted merely because they are
limited to dealing with specified subjects such as safety
and health or training.  Employer-dominated representation
is undemocratic regardless of the particular subjects with
which the employer-controlled representative deals.
In dissenting from the recommendation to amend Section
8(a)(2), I wish to make clear that I do not minimize the
value of encouraging -employee participation- and -labor-
management cooperation.-  But to my mind, the kind of -
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participation- and -cooperation- that should be encouraged
is democratic participation and cooperation between equals.
 I agree with Peter Pestillo, the Executive Vice President
of Ford Motor Company, that -A strong alliance requires two
strong members.  There should be no quibbling about that.-
 And I likewise agree with Morton Bahr, the President of the
Communication Workers of America, that:
to effectively participate in workplace decision-making,
front-line workers must first have their own organizations,
educated leadership, and significant resources in order to
have the confidence and preparation to participate as equals
and without fear. [Sept. l5, l993 tr. at 63]
Because I am deeply committed to the principal of work place
democracy,  I cannot join in any statement that proclaims
that you can have fully effective worker management
cooperation programs without having a truly equal
partnership based upon workers having an independent voice.
 I must therefore dissent.
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III. Worker Representation and Collective Bargaining
 1.   GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS
 (1) The Role of Unions in Society
The preamble to the National Labor Relations Act declares it
to be the policy of the United States to `encourage  the
practices and procedure of collective bargaining and [to]
protect ... the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and condition of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.'
The Collective Bargaining Forum, a group of leading
corporate chief executives and national labor leaders,
reflecting on this policy, has stated:
"The institution of collective bargaining is an integral
part of American economic life and has proved capable of
helping our society adjust through periods of prosperity
and recession.  A democratic society must provide workers
with effective rights to join and be represented by unions
of their own choosing."<Footnote: New Directions for Labor
and Management, The Collective Bargaining Forum, Washington,
D.C.:  U.S. Department of Labor, 1988.>
Unions contribute to the economic health of the nation by
`leveling the field between labor and management,' as
Senator Orrin Hatch has stated.  `If you didn't have
unions,' Senator Hatch continued," it would be very
difficult for even enlightened employers to not take
advantage of workers on wages and working conditions because
of rivals."<Footnote: Business Week, May 23, l994, p.70.>
 Indeed, as we noted in the Fact Finding Report, and as the
President's Council of Economic Advisors also has concluded,
the recent decline in the proportion of workers represented
by unions has `contributed to the rise in inequality' in the
United States.
Unions likewise contribute to the political health of the
nation by providing a legitimate and consistent voice to
working people in the broader society.  As former Secretary
of State George P. Shultz has stated, `free societies and
free trade unions go together.'  Societies that lack a
vibrant labor movement which will `really get up on its hind
legs and fight about freedom' are sorely wanting.<Footnote:
Quoted in Leonard Silk, New York Times, Dec. 13, 1992, p.
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D2. >
The import of the worst features of political campaigns into
the workplaces by managers and unions creates confrontation
and is not conducive to achieving the goals outlined in
Section I.  The Commission remains persuaded   that, as we
said in our Fact Finding Report, `All participants --
employees, management, and unions - would benefit from
reduction in illegal activity and de-escalation of a
conflictual process that seems out of place with the
demands of many modern workplaces and the need of workers,
their unions, and their employers.'    (p. 141)
The Commission cannot hope to do more than propose first
steps on the necessary road to achieving a new direction and
approach to labor-management relations.  The process of
change will require a long, sustained effort.  But we
believe that American society -- management, labor, and the
general public -- does support the principle that workers
have the right to make a free, uncoerced and informed choice
as to whether to join a union and to engage in collective
bargaining.  Our recommendations seek to, as we said at the
outset, `turn down the decibel count' and to effectuate this
fundamental principle of our democracy.
(2)  Established Collective Bargaining Relationships
Not all aspects of collective bargaining are in need of
repair. The Fact Finding Report concluded that `In most
workplaces with collective bargaining, the system of labor-
management negotiations works well' (p.64).  Mr. Howard
Knicely, speaking for the Labor Policy Association, would
elevate this observation to a principal finding:
 `collective bargaining where it exists, is working very
well.'
The majority of managers and workers with experience under
collective bargaining agree with this assessment.  Both the
Worker Representation and Participation Survey and others
before it report that about 90 percent of union members
would vote to retain their membership if asked.
Approximately 70 percent rate their experience with their
union as good or very good.  Sixty-four percent of the
managers surveyed agreed that the union in their companies
makes the work lives of its members better.  When asked how
the union relationship affects their companies, managers'
views vary considerably.  Twenty-seven percent believe the
union helps their company's performance; 38 percent believe
it hurts performance, and 29 percent believe the union
neither helps nor hurts organizational performance.  By a
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two to one margin (32 to 16 percent) managers report that in
recent years their relations with unions have become more
cooperative rather than confrontational.
In general, though there are notable exceptions, collective
bargaining appears to be adapting to its changing economic
and social setting.  Work stoppages have declined
significantly, many grievance procedures are experiencing
more settlements through informal discussions or mediation
without resort to arbitration.  The AFL-CIO's February 1994
report, The New American Workplace:  A Labor
Perspective,<Footnote: The New American Workplace:  A Labor
 Perspective, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., February, 1994.> is
a significant statement endorsing workplace cooperation and
labor-management partnerships.
A number of collective bargaining agreements in 1994 extend
the frontiers of labor-management partnerships to new
issues, new levels of decision-making, and new workers.
 Among the more notable recent examples are the Levi-Strauss
and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Worker agreement
governing manufacturing innovations in union and non-union
facilities, the Bath Iron Works and International
Association of Machinists agreement providing for
significant restructuring of jobs, training, and pay systems
among multiple trades, and the NYNEX and Communications
Workers of America agreement that provides for voluntary
procedures governing the organizing of new work units and
the negotiation and arbitration of initial contracts.
Innovations such as these need to be encouraged and extended
to more bargaining relationships.  But additional changes
will be needed in the attitudes and policies of many labor
organizations and managers if the goals of the workplace of
the future outlined in Section I are to be achieved.  One
area in need of greater focus is the responsiveness of
workplace practices to the needs of working women.  A large
scale survey of working women published by the Women's
Bureau of the Department of Labor in October 1994 reported
that, while most women are breadwinners and many are the
sole support of their households, `they are not getting the
pay and benefits commensurate with the work they do, the
level of responsibility they hold, or the societal
contribution they make.'<Footnote:  Working Women Count, The
Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, 1994, p. 5.See,
the testimony of Susan Bianchi-Sands and associates on July
25, 1994, and Judith L. Lichtman and a panel of women's
organizations and Gloria Johnson for the AFL-CIO and the
Coalition of Union Women on September 29, 1994.>
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Collective bargaining will need to continue to evolve and
adapt in the future as the diversity of the workforce
increases in terms of gender, race, ethnic background,
education, and location of work.  The Women's Bureau Survey,
the Worker Representation and Participation Survey, and many
others document the desire of workers for more say over a
wide range of workplace issues as well as a desire for
cooperative rather than conflictual processes for addressing
their concerns.
It is in the national interest to encourage continued growth
in the range of issues and workplaces governed by
cooperative labor-management partnerships.  The Commission
believes that existing collective bargaining relationships
are progressing in this direction, and considers it
important that new bargaining relationships achieve this
same level of cooperation and effectiveness as soon as
possible.
(3)  New Collective Bargaining Relationships<Footnote: For
the detailed policy proposals of representatives of labor
organizations and  managements, see the transcript of
September 8, l994 including the statement, `Recommendations
of the AFL-CIO to the Commission on the Future of Worker-
 Management Relations Concerning Changes in the National
Labor Relations Act and Related Laws,' (28 pages).>
The Fact Finding Report of the Commission documented the
findings of the Commission (pp. 77-79) with respect to new
organizing situations.
1.   American society -- management, labor, and the general
public -- supports the principle that workers have the right
to join a union and to engage in collective bargaining if a
majority of workers so desire.
2.   Representation elections as currently constituted are
highly conflictual for workers, unions, and firms.  This
means that many new collective bargaining relationships
start off in an environment that is highly adversarial.
3.   The probability that a worker will be discharged or
otherwise unfairly discriminated against for exercising
legal rights under the NLRA has increased over time.  Unions
as well as firms have engaged in unfair labor practices
under the NLRA. The bulk of meritorious charges are for
employer unfair practices.
4.   Consistent with other surveys reported earlier, the
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Worker Representation and Participation Survey found that 32
percent of unorganized workers would vote to join a union if
an election were held at their workplace.  Eighty-two
percent of those favoring unionization (and 33 percent of
all non-union workers) believe a majority of their fellow
employees would vote to unionize.
5.  Roughly a third of workplaces that vote to be
represented by a union do not obtain a collective bargaining
contract with their employer.
Together these facts document the need to improve the
process by which workers decide whether or not to be
represented at the workplace and engage in collective
bargaining.<Footnote: The Commission considered a proposal
to increase the NLRA's jurisdictional floors in view of the
substantial increase in wages and prices since the floors
were set in the statute in 1959.  The Commission raised this
issue by letter with each major business organization and
the AFL-CIO.  Most of the organizations that responded
opposed increasing the jurisdictional amounts.>
2.   RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission believes that several revisions in the laws
governing the representation process will render employee
decisions about whether to engage in collective bargaining
simpler, more timely, and less conflictual, thus making this
institution more accessible to those employees who want it.
 Here is what we recommend:
1.  Representation elections should be held before rather
than after legal hearings about issues such as the scope of
the bargaining unit.  The elections should be conducted as
promptly as administratively feasible, typically within two
weeks.
2.  The injunctions provided for in section 10(l) of the Act
should be used to remedy discriminatory actions against
employees that occur in organizing campaigns and first
contract negotiations.
3.  Employers and newly certified unions should be assisted
in achieving first contracts by a substantially upgraded
dispute resolution program.  The program should feature
mediation and a tripartite advisory board empowered to
implement options ranging from self-help (strikes or
lockouts) to binding arbitration for the relatively few
disputes that warrant it.
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(1)  Prompt Certification Elections
The Commission's Fact Finding Report confirmed that the
process by which workers decide whether or not to engage in
collective bargaining is among the most contentious aspects
of American labor relations.  In order to have a union
certified as their representative, American workers must
seek an NLRB election to determine whether a majority of an
appropriate bargaining unit wishes to be represented by the
union.  Before holding an election, the Board must address
legal issues raised by the employer and union, most
importantly, the scope of the bargaining unit, and inclusion
or exclusion of particular employees therein. Either party
has a right to a formal hearing on these matters, which
causes a substantial delay.  NLRB General Counsel Frederick
Feinstein told the Commission that the automatic available
it of such hearing procedures means that a party seeking
delay `can safely assume' that it will be able to push an
election back three to six months.  In practice, it takes an
average of seven weeks for workers to secure a vote from the
time their petition is filed.
During this time, the union and employer typically face off
in a heated campaign.  The government has been hesitant to
regulate the two sides too closely during these contests in
order to preserve the parties' freedom of speech.  Both
sides  often hurl allegations, distortions, and promises
that poison the relationship and make it difficult to
achieve a collective bargaining agreement in cases where the
workers vote to unionize.  The Fact Finding Report revealed
that in recent decade’s employer unfair labor practices
during these campaigns have risen: both in terms of the
ratio of unfair labor practice charges against employers to
the number of elections and the percentage of such charges
found to have merit.  In particular, discharges of union
activists are up: the data show that improper dismissals
occur in one of every four elections.  American workers are
afraid of this prospect: 79 percent say it is likely that
employees who seek union representation will lose their
jobs, and 41 percent of nonunion workers say they think they
might lose their own jobs if they tried to organize.  This
fear is no doubt one cause of the persistent unsatisfied
demand for union representation on the part of a substantial
minority of American workers.  The Worker Representation and
Participation Survey reported that 32 percent of nonunion
workers would vote for a union and think their co-workers
would too.
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The Commission believes the NLRB should conduct
representation elections as promptly as administratively
feasible.  A lengthy, political-style election campaign
serves no useful purpose in the labor-management context.
 Each side would continue to have ample time to express its
views if the process were much shorter.  Furthermore, much
of the conflict that mars the election process would be
eliminated if the process was shortened, which would set the
stage for a more cooperative employer-union relationship if
the employees voted in favor of collective bargaining.
The requirement that the Board hold pre-election legal
hearings prevents it from expediting the election process in
a significant way.  General Counsel Feinstein, who has
initiated a major effort to conduct elections more promptly,
testified that the best he can hope for under current law is
to hold most elections within seven weeks and all elections
within eight weeks.  The Commission considers this
inadequate.  We conclude that the Board should conduct
elections as promptly as administratively feasible,
typically no later than two weeks after a petition is filed.
 To accomplish this, the Board must hold inquiries and
hearings on contested issues after the election (with any
disputed ballots sealed in the interim).  The Commission has
been assured by the NLRB that it would be perfectly feasible
as a logistical matter to conduct the vast majority of
elections in less than two weeks, as long as the appropriate
changes are made in the governing law and the Board
reorganizes its staff and resources to undertake this
important task.<Footnote: The NLRB is in the process of
deciding whether it may conduct pre-hearing elections on its
own authority.  The Commission takes no position on this
legal question of the Board's authority.>
Such a change would not only facilitate prompt elections and
eliminate a major locus of labor-management conflict, it
would also afford substantial administrative savings.
 Currently, many Board hearings are held despite the absence
of significant legal issues, simply because one of the
parties seeks a tactical advantage.  There are two principal
tactical reasons why parties demand hearings.  The first is
to give one party an advantage in the election by excluding
or including particular employees based on how they are
likely to vote.  The need for such hearings would be reduced
under our proposal because a party that would seek a pre-
vote hearing under the current system in order to gain a
bargaining unit more likely to vote its way would not be
interested in a post-election hearing as long as it either
(1) won the election or (2) lost it by a margin greater than
the number of disputed voters it had hoped to include.
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The second tactical reason parties seek hearings is to delay
the election in order to increase their chances of a
favorable outcome.  The Commission believes that a system is
poorly designed if it gives parties an incentive and
opportunity to seek delay for its own sake.  Hearings
motivated by a desire to delay the election would obviously
be eliminated altogether in a system that allowed hearings
only after the election had taken place.
The simple design change of holding prompt elections, before
rather than after certification hearings, is pivotal to our
recommendations for improving the representation process.
 In addition to reducing delay and conflict, this reform
would diminish the need for government regulation of the
labor-management relationship and make the government more
customer-friendly.  The NLRB would be more customer-
friendly because employees seeking elections would get them
quickly, without a spate of confusing litigation, and
usually with much less conflict between the union and the
employer.  As for regulation, in addition to eliminating the
need for many hearings, as described above, pre-hearing
elections would reduce the need for oversight of the
parties' conduct during the election campaign.  Such
regulation has always been extremely controversial because
it involves property and speech rights.  The need for it is
diminished to the extent that a protracted election campaign
and concomitant pitched battle between the antagonists are
cut down to a reasonable size.
We encourage employers and unions who desire a cooperative
relationship to agree to determine the employees' majority
preference via a `card check.'  Card checks are particularly
appropriate vehicles for enhancing worker-management
cooperation when a union already represents part of an
employer's workforce and the parties seek a non-conflictual
way to determine whether additional employees want that same
form of representation.  Card check  agreements build trust
between union and employer and avoid expending public and
private resources on unnecessary election campaigns.  Such
agreements are a classic example of potential or former
adversaries creating a win-win situation for themselves. The
opportunity to gain representation rights via a simple
majority sign-up gives the union an incentive to cooperate
with the employer to make the workplace more efficient.  In
return, the employer gains the cooperation of the employee
representative as partner in efforts to improve productivity
and flexibility, and often improved morale and reduced
turnover as well.
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(2)  Timely Injunctive Relief for Discriminatory Actions
The Fact Finding Report identified several areas of concern
about the tools available to the NLRB to remedy violations
of the Act. The Board can obtain injunctions against unions
(for organizational or secondary boycotts) far more easily
and swiftly than it can against employers, particularly for
discriminatory discharges of union supporters. In general,
the remedies the Board may prescribe against employers are
remedial and reparative rather than deterrent, and the
sanctions against employers for violating labor law are far
weaker than analogous penalties for breaking other federal
employment statutes. The increase in discriminatory
discharges documented in the Fact Finding Report indicates
that the remedies available to the Board do not provide a
strong enough disincentive to deter unfair labor practices
of some employers during certification elections and first
contract campaigns.
The Commission believes expedited injunctive relief offers a
first step toward improving compliance with the Act.  In our
judgment, this is not only the most effective, least
litigious, and least costly path, it will also complement
the holding of representation elections as promptly as
administratively feasible.  The combination of prompt
elections and immediate injunctive relief against
discriminatory actions would eliminate much of the incentive
for engaging in discriminatory behavior.  An injunction not
only undoes the harm caused by the illegal act, but also
weakens the position of the discriminator by making it look
bad and the other side look effective in the eyes of the
employees.  The Commission believes this `backfire' effect
would provide the greatest disincentive for wrongdoing.
Under current law the Board has two principal sources of
authority for seeking injunctions: NLRA sections 10(j) and
(l). Only the slower and weaker of these two provisions,
section 10(j), is available to remedy the general range of
employer and union unfair labor practices.  The swift,
automatic, and thus more effective section 10(l) applies
only to certain union-side violations.  Section 10(l) is the
more powerful instrument for two principal reasons:  (1) it
is mandatory, whereas section 10(j) is discretionary; (2) it
is faster, both because it is triggered by an unfair labor
practice charge whereas section 10(j) requires a formal
unfair labor practice complaint, and because the Board must
give section 10(l) cases `priority over all other cases.' As
a result of these differences, NLRB General Counsel
Feinstein told the Commission that section 10(l) cases take
the Board five days to process, whereas section 10(j) cases
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take 65 days or more just to get into court, let alone to
secure an injunction from the judge.
The Commission recommends that Congress make section 10(l)
injunctive relief available not only to employers harmed by
union secondary boycotts, but also to employees who are
victims of employer discriminatory actions from the
beginning of an organizing effort to the signing of a first
contract.  The timely use of injunctions in these situations
will help abate many of the problems the Commission was
instructed to address.  Most obviously, injunctions that can
be obtained within days rather than months will reduce
delay.  Quick resolution of unfair labor practice charges
during the crucial election and first contract period will
also increase labor-management cooperation by preventing
disputes from starting and then festering.  Prompt
injunctive relief will remove the coercive effect on
employee free choice.  The increased efficacy of this remedy
will deter discriminatory behavior as well as rectify it,
and will increase respect for the NLRB among the general
public and its primary constituency -- American workers.
 (3)  Resolution of First Contract Disputes
The Commission believes that once a majority of workers has
voted for independent union representation for purposes of
collective bargaining, the debate about whether a bargaining
relationship is to be established should be over.  At this
point, the parties' energies and the public's resources
should turn to creating an effective ongoing relationship
that is suited to the needs of their workplace.  Every
effort should be made to ensure that a satisfactory
agreement is concluded and that the process used to reach
that agreement leads to the development of a cooperative
bargaining relationship.
The Fact Finding Report noted that one-third or more of
certified units fail to reach a first contract, and that
strikes taking place in first contract negotiations tend to
be longer and to result in fewer settlements than strikes
occurring in established bargaining relationships.
 Moreover, evidence from studies presented to the Commission
document that the probability of achieving a first contract
is reduced in settings where unfair labor practices or other
hard bargaining tactics are carried over from the election
campaign into the contract negotiation process.  Clearly,
improvements in the effectiveness of the first contract
negotiation process are called for.
However, in developing a proposal one must guard against
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reducing the parties' incentives to negotiate a realistic
agreement.  Care should be taken to avoid any chance that
unworkable or harmful terms are imposed on the parties by a
neutral who is uninformed about the issues or unaccountable
to the parties or the public.  Several witnesses pointed out
to the Commission that negotiations sometimes fail because
one side or the other holds out for numerous, unrealistic
proposals.  The process must encourage parties to reach
their own agreements, accept the possibility that a strike
or lockout may be the most appropriate way to address
unrealistic expectations or demands, and allow for the use
of arbitration if in the judgment of experienced and
respected professionals this is the best way to assure that
an initial agreement will be achieved.
The Commission received a number of proposals for improving
the first contract negotiation process.  Some witnesses
suggested that arbitration be required of all first contract
disputes that remain unresolved after a specified period of
time.  Others proposed requiring arbitration if the NLRB
finds one of the parties to be bargaining in bad faith or
engaged in other unfair labor practices.  The Commission
finds both of these options unsatisfactory.  The first would
reduce the incentives of the parties to negotiate on their
own.  The second suffers from severe administrative
difficulties, because NLRB procedures for determining
whether or not bad faith bargaining has occurred are already
time consuming and would be newly taxed if arbitration
became available as a remedy.  Moreover, it is often
difficult to determine whether a violation of good faith
bargaining law has occurred, as opposed to permissible hard
bargaining about the issues.  Most important, the Commission
believes that if worker-management cooperation is to be
increased, the focus must shift from determining blame and
assessing punishment to facilitating agreement wherever
possible.
The Commission offers the following as a first contract
dispute resolution system that meets the above objectives.
 An employer and newly certified union would have early
access to the services of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service or private mediation.  A tripartite
First Contract Advisory Board would be established to review
disputes not settled by negotiations or mediation.  The
Advisory Board would be empowered to use a wide range of
options to resolve disputes, including referring them back
to the parties to negotiate with the right to strike or
lockout, further mediation or fact finding, or use of
arbitration in the form that is judged to be best suited to
the circumstances of the particular case.  The
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`certification year' (in which the union's majority status
is presumed) would begin when the Advisory Board decides
which course to  take.
Making arbitration available in first contract cases is
crucial to the overall representation system.  The
Commission believes it will be necessary to invoke
arbitration only rarely, but the prospect of its use in
situations where one side or the other has been recalcitrant
in negotiations will motivate the parties to reach mutually
acceptable compromises.  Maximizing the number of such
voluntary agreements is the goal of any dispute resolution
system, and is vitally important at this stage in the
development of an enduring and cooperative labor-management
relationship.
(4)  Employee Access to Employer and Union Views on
Independent Representation
The Commission received many proposals to modify current
rules governing employee access to employer and union views
on collective bargaining.  We affirm the important role such
access plays in employee decision-making about collective
bargaining.  It is a central tenet of U.S. labor policy that
employees should be free to make an informed and uncoerced
choice as to whether or not they wish independent
representation at work.  The `effectiveness' of that right,
as the Supreme Court has stated, `depends in some measure on
the ability of employees to learn the advantages and
disadvantages of organization from others."<Footnote:
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (l972).>
The Commission is aware that there is an imbalance in this
area.  The ability of employers to present their views to
employees is assured at the workplace.  Employers have daily
contact with employees and are free to express their views
from the date of hire.  Employers may distribute written
material to their employees and post materials in the
workplace.  Employers also may require employee attendance
at so called `captive audience' meetings to hear the
employer's point of view.  In addition, the employer may
devote as much work time as it desires to supervisory
activity advising employees about the employer's position,
including one-on-one or small group meetings between
supervisors and employees.  Indeed, supervisors who refuse
to participate in the company's campaign against union
representation for the employees may be discharged for their
refusal.
By contrast, employees have little access to the union at
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work -- the one place where employees naturally congregate.
 Union representatives are typically excluded from the
worksite altogether and are all but uniformly excluded from
the meetings held by the employer.  Even non-working areas
which are accessible to the general public -- such as
parking lots or cafeterias -- are off-limits to the union
organizer.
In order to make up for these restrictions, the union is
given a list of employee names and addresses so it can
contact workers at home.  But the names of the constituents
the union seeks to represent become available only if the
union is able to achieve the 30 percent level of support
necessary to secure an election, and then only 10-20 days
before the election (in what typically is a fifty-day
campaign).  Efforts to communicate with workers when they
leave the worksite and disperse into the community are far
more costly and far less likely to succeed in reaching the
workforce than worksite communications.  As the Supreme
Court has stated, the workplace is `a particularly
appropriate place' for work-related communications `because
it is the place where employees clearly share common
interest and where they additionally seek to persuade fellow
workers in matters affecting their union organizational life
and other matters related to their status as employees.'
<Footnote:  Eastex,  Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574
(l978).>
The Commission has come to the conclusion that, as Professor
Matthew Finkin testified, `the law should allow the widest
practicable dissemination to employees of their statutory
rights and of the availability of representation.  It does
not.'  However, we are also cognizant of the difficulty of
regulating the access issue.
As a first step, Congress should reverse the Supreme Court's
decision in Lechmere v. NLRB<Footnote:  112 S.Ct. 841
(1992).> so that employees may have access to union
organizers in privately-owned but publicly-used spaces such
as shopping malls. It runs counter to our democratic
traditions to bar advocates of independent union
representation from these areas.  What is more, in practice
Lechmere harms not only advocates for unions but also those
of other causes, because of the way this decision interacts
with the other legal requirement that the employer can not
have discriminatory solicitation rules.  This means that, in
order to keep union representatives from having contact with
employees, many mall owners have barred groups like the
Salvation Army and the Girl Scouts as well.  Congress should
make it clear that labor groups and others have a right of
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access to this form of `public-private' space, which has
taken over the role of Main Street in so many American
communities.
Further revisions of the rules relating to access are best
left to the considered judgment of the NLRB.  We note that
 the Board has significant leeway in this area, and has not
visited it in a fundamental way in three decades.<Footnote:
See General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1222 (1966).>  We
encourage the Board to examine its current practice
carefully to determine the extent to which it provides
employees a fair opportunity to hear a balanced discussion
of the relevant issues.  Should the prompt election system
we recommend be enacted, the Board may need to tailor the
access rules to fit new circumstances.  In any event, we
urge the Board to strive to afford employees the most equal
and  democratic dialogue possible.
(5)  Conclusion
Employee freedom of choice about whether to have independent
union representation for purposes of collective bargaining
remains one of the cornerstones of a flexible system of
worker-management cooperation in our democratic society,
whatever portion of the workforce decides to avail itself of
this form of participation.  A labor relations environment
marked by prompt, pre-hearing elections, effective
injunctive relief for discriminatory reprisals in the
representation process, and flexible dispute resolution of
first contract negotiations, including arbitration where
necessary, will provide American workers greater freedom to
choose collective bargaining if that is what they want.
 Taking these steps is an integral part of an effort to
reduce conflictual relations and to reform the regime
governing workplace participation.  Employee free choice
about independent union representation serves both as
guarantor of the integrity of employee involvement plans in
non-union facilities and as a voluntary worker-management
alternative to direct federal regulation of the employment
relationship.
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IV.  Employment Litigation  and Dispute Resolution
1.   INTRODUCTION
 Chapter IV of the Fact Finding Report detailed two distinct
problems in contemporary employment law.  The first is a steep
rise in administrative regulation of the workplace, whose
overlapping mandates (both federal and state) impose significant
costs on employers and employees.  The second is the explosion of
litigation under laws that rely in whole or in part on individual
lawsuits for enforcement.  Primary examples of such privately
enforced laws are the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
As the origin and form of these two problems differ in many
respects, the Commission will deal with each separately. -This
section will focus on the employment litigation crisis and the
variety of alternative forms of dispute resolution that have been
suggested to the Commission as potential reform measures.
Section VI will address the distinct problem raised by
administrative regulation.
As the Fact Finding Report discussed in detail, employment
litigation has spiraled in the last two decades.  The expansion
of federal and state discrimination laws and the growth in common
law and statutory protection against wrongful dismissal have
provided employees with a broader array of tools with which to
challenge employer behavior in court.  In the federal courts
alone, the number of suits filed concerning employment grievances
grew over 400 percent in the last two decades. -Complaints
lodged with administrative agencies have risen at a similar rate:
for example, in 1993, the EEOC received nearly 90,000
discrimination complaints from employees across the country.
Employment litigation is a costly option for both employers and
employees. -For every dollar paid to employees through
litigation, at least another dollar is paid to attorneys involved
in handling both meritorious and non-meritorious claims.
-Moreover, aside from the direct costs of litigation, employers
often dedicate significant sums to designing defensive personnel
practices (with the help of lawyers) to minimize their litigation
exposure. -These costs tend to affect compensation: -as the
firm’s employment law expenses grow, less resources are available
to provide wage and benefits to workers.
Further, while the prospective costs of court awards do serve to
deter employers from illegal actions, it is not clear that
50
litigation protects all kinds of employees equally well.  Most
employment discrimination suits are brought by employees who have
already left the job where the discrimination took place.
Further, those ex-employees who bring suit tend to come from the
ranks of managers and professionals rather than from lower-level
workers.
Finally, even for those employees properly situated to file suit,
the pursuit of a legal claim through litigation often proves
stressful and unsatisfying. Overburdened federal and state
judicial dockets mean that years often pass before an aggrieved
employee is able to present his or her claim in court.<Footnote: In
the very last stages of the Commission's deliberations, a panel of
nine federal judges commissioned by the Judicial Conference of
the U.S. released a draft report of the “impending crisis” in the
federal court system growing out of the huge increases in the
case load on federal dockets. -The panel detailed the upward
trend in federal court litigation and underlined the wave of new
federal legislation — such as the l994 Crime Bill — which grants
federal jurisdiction to a whole new range of crimes.  This
increase in criminal cases on the federal docket, the panel
emphasized, will further slow the already torpid rate of
processing civil complaints in the federal court: -since
criminal cases are given priority over civil cases, the expansion
of federal penalties for violent crimes will only move civil
claims further back on the list of cases awaiting trial.  To
help alleviate the burden on federal courts, the panel
recommended restricting access -for several classes of disputes
-- including anti-discrimination claims brought under federal
employment laws. -The panel encouraged Congress to bar employee
complainants from bringing claims in federal court unless the
EEOC had thoroughly investigated the complaint and found it to be
of merit. -These recommendations underline the diminishing
opportunities for employees to vindicate public employment rights
through the court system. -Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, Dec.
l994; Robert Pear “Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal
Court,” New York Times, Dec. 5, l995, p. Al. >  -The combative
nature of litigation tends to push the employee to the sidelines
in this legal struggle, though occasionally subjecting employees
to detailed investigation of their personal histories and
character.<Footnote: Recent trends in sexual harassment litigation
reveal that aggressive defense attorneys have begun to interrogate
the complaining employee intensely about her sexual history,
personal relationships, or history of child molestation or venereal
disease, in order to discredit her character and credibility.
-The Bedroom Ploy: -Plaintiffs’ Sex Lives Are Being Laid
Bare in Harassment Cases,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. l9, l994,
p. Al.>
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These problems with the legislative model have led many
employers, employee groups, and lawmakers to seek alternatives.
-In fact, in both the Americans with Disabilities Act of l990
and the Civil Rights Act of l991, Congress specifically
encouraged alternative methods of resolving discrimination
disputes "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by the
law."
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a generic concept
connotes the entire class of mechanisms which facilitate private
resolution of disputes. -Such private dispute resolution can
take three different forms.  First, the parties may try to
resolve their dispute through direct, in-house negotiations.
-Second, the parties may avail themselves of a mediation system
sponsored by the courts or other government agency responsible
for that class of disputes.  The goal of these first two
mechanisms is securing a solution both parties will accept
voluntarily. When such efforts at voluntary resolution fail,
however, a third type of private mechanism -- arbitration -- is
needed to produce a binding disposition of the case. -Private
arbitration serves as an alternative to the court system or
administrative tribunal normally charged with adjudicating such
disputes.
In l991, the United States Supreme Court showed itself receptive
to the arbitration model of binding ADR mechanisms. -In its
Gilmer decision, reviewed in detail in the Fact Finding
Report, (pp. 117-118) the Court enforced a securities dealer's
agreement to arbitrate all disputes, including employment
disputes arising under public laws (there, age discrimination).
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court in
Gilmer did not specifically address whether employers
generally could require arbitration under the employment
contract. -The Commission also underlines that the Court's
decision rested on an interpretation of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) -- a statute enacted in 1920, more than forty years
before modern employment rights were created.
The Supreme Court also assumed in Gilmer that arbitration
agreements were enforceable only if the arbitration system
satisfied minimum standards of quality. The court did not,
however, conduct a systematic appraisal of the problems posed by
integrating arbitration into the employment setting, nor did it
issue any specific guidelines for judicial review of arbitral
design.
Testimony before the Commission indicated that recent employer
experimentation with arbitration has produced programs that range
from serious and fair alternatives to litigation, to mechanisms
that appear to be of dubious merit for enforcing the public
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values embedded in our laws. <Footnote: A Wall Street Journal
article ("More Law Firms Seek Arbitration for Internal Disputes,"
Sept. 26, l994, p. B 13) describes how a number of large law firms
are establishing ADR programs in the wake of a $7 million jury
verdict against a firm for sexual harassment by one of its
partners. -One of the programs mentioned was troubling: -the
arbitrator for an employee's dispute had to be selected from a
pool composed of partners in law firms with 50 lawyers or more.>
--The challenge, then, is how to encourage the creative
potential of alternatives to standard court litigation, while
ensuring that the legal needs and priorities of a diverse
American work force are fairly satisfied.
(l) Private Parties Should be Encouraged to Adopt In-House ADR
Systems
The Commission strongly supports the expansion and development of
alternative workplace dispute resolution mechanisms, including
both in-house settlement procedures and voluntary arbitration
systems that meet specified standards of fairness. -In the
near-term, the formation of such high-quality, low-cost
alternatives to litigation would greatly increase the
accessibility of public law protections to low wage workers.
(2) Private Arbitration Systems Should Meet Quality Standards for
Fairness
The Commission proposes that private arbitration systems meet six
key quality standards. -These standards, the Commission
believes, will assure employees participating in private systems
a fair and full airing of their complaints, and a full range of
relief for the real victims of employment discrimination. -At
the same time, these standards leave ample room for employers to
experiment with a variety of private arbitration systems which
will help insulate employers from the high costs of defending
meritless but expensive employee suits in court.
We develop this recommendation further at the end of this
Section, where we break it down into two recommendations.
2.   IN-HOUSE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Efforts to resolve disputes early and amicably depend heavily on
employee participation in creating and running the dispute
resolution mechanism, whatever particular form it takes. -One
of the most commonly cited effects of employee participation is
that it can reduce both the number of formal grievances filed and
the percentage taken to higher steps of the procedure or to
arbitration. -Effective procedures for communication and
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workplace problem solving help to build the trust needed to solve
problems before they escalate into complaints - especially if the
employee participation process is empowered to handle the issues
of critical concern to employees. -Thus, the Commission sees
successful implementation of its recommendations concerning
employee participation and worker representation as essential if
ADR systems are to be encouraged and promoted as a part of
national policy.
Effective dispute resolution systems rest on a foundation of
workplace practices that stress respect for individual and
collective rights and that engender a climate of trust at the
workplace. -Education about and communication of policies for
resolving disputes is another essential building block for an
effective system. -In recent years, for example, heightened
awareness of sexual harassment concerns has led many
organizations to strengthen their policies and procedures for
dealing with harassment and for communicating these policies to
members of the organization and educating them about this
issue.<Footnote: Johns Hopkins University, for example, made
extensive use of faculty and staff advisory committees to
communicate with and obtain input from its university community in
developing a system for handling sexual harassment and related
problems. -So did the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
other organizations.>
Dispute resolution systems experts stress the importance of
providing multiple options for handling workplace problems that
do occur. -The options most often included in these systems are
direct negotiations among the disputants, counseling and
assistance by a trained facilitator, mediation, fact-finding,
peer review, and finally formal procedures for issuing a
decision.  Multiple options are needed both because of a variety
of issues that can arise and because some employees will prefer
informal and confidential procedures while others will prefer
more formal alternatives.<Footnote: The Brown & Root Corporation
provided the Commission a description of a multi-option system
implemented in their corporation in February, l993. -Their program
includes four steps: -(1) an open door policy whereby an employee
can go to a manager at a higher level than the one with whom he or
she has a dispute; (2) a conference in which an employee meets with
a company representative and a staff person from the dispute
resolution system to discuss options for resolving the issue; (3)
mediation with an outside mediator supplied by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA); and (4) arbitration with an
outside arbitrator also supplied by the AAA.Individual
employees have the right to be represented by an attorney of
their choice and the company pays up to $2,500 of the employee’s
legal fees (although so far none of the employees who have
pursued cases to arbitration have taken advantage of this offer).
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-The employee pays the first $50 for the outside mediation or
arbitration service and the company pays the rest. -The company
says almost 500 employees have used the system, 75 percent of the
cases were resolved within four weeks, and there have been 25
outside mediations and four arbitrations. -The annualized cost
of the program is substantially less than what one large court
case would cost the two sides.Brown & Root requires
participation in the plan -- including foregoing litigation for
arbitration or mediation -- as a condition of employment for all
of its non-union employees in the U.S. The company has, however,
reserved the right to terminate the plan at its will.>
Most experts agree that it is important to involve a wide
cross-section of the workforce in the design and administration
of workplace dispute resolution systems.<Footnote: See, testimony
to the Commission of the Labor Policy Association presented by Mr.
Joseph  F. Vella, Vice President, Federated Department Stores,
Sept. 29, l994, p. 15.> -Practice varies considerably, however,
on this issue. -In unionized settings, employees have input
into the design and/or modification of the system through
contract negotiations and through their shop --stewards
and/or grievance committee repre- sentatives. -In non-union
settings procedures vary more widely.  A long-standing system in
place at Donnelly Corporation in Michigan involves employees
through elected representative committees that have authority to
make binding decisions to resolve grievances or complaints. -As
noted in the Fact Finding Report (p.59), this is part of a
broader system of employee participation in the company.
-However, few other companies have as much employee
participation built into their systems as Donnelly.<Footnote: In
particular, very few ADR systems presently involve employee
representatives directly in the oversight or evaluation of the
system.  Brown & Root's dispute resolution system, for example,
reports to a Dispute Resolution Policy Committee composed of
senior executives of the company. -Submission of Mr. Joe
Stevens, p.12.> -
Employee advocates see the need for a strong and informed role
for employee representatives in ADR systems. -Some believe that
no system of employee involvement can overcome the power
imbalances inherent in employment relationships if employees lack
independent representation, either through a union or some other
organization not controlled by management. -Ms. Judith
Lichtman, President of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, emphasized
this point in testimony to the Commission:
We remain very concerned about the potential for abuse of ADR
created by the imbalance of power between employer and employee,
and the resulting unfairness to employees who, voluntarily or
otherwise, submit their disputes to ADR. -These concerns are
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obvious if the process is controlled unilaterally by employers,
such as when employees are required to sign mandatory arbitration
clauses as a condition of employment; union representation may
greatly reduce this disparity.<Footnote: Oral Statement of Judith
L. Lichtman, President, Women's Legal Defense Fund, September 29,
l994.> -
This view was echoed by representatives of other women's and
worker advocacy groups.<Footnote: See, e.g., Sept. 29, l994
testimony of Mr. Nelson Carrasquillo, Executive Director,
Farmworkers Support Committee.> -Yet women's groups also recognize
that, if properly designed and used to supplement government and
court enforcement of workers' rights, ADR systems can be useful in
resolving disputes.<Footnote: Testimony of Ms. Judith Lichtman,
Sept. 29, l994.  See also the Sept. 29, l994 testimony of Ms.
Martha Burk, President, Center for the Advancement of Public
Policy, speaking for a coalition of 20 women's organizations.>
The Commission sees the development of private systems for
prevention or informal resolution of disputes, tailored
appropriately to fit different employment settings, as essential
to the effectiveness of the more formal arbitration procedures
discussed in the next section. -The Commission also believes
there is considerable scope for future innovation in these
systems. -For example, unions, professional associations, and
other worker advocacy groups may wish to market their services in
representing individuals in these processes and providing
technical advice and services in the design and oversight of
these systems. -The Commission encourages experimentation with
and evaluation of current ADR systems and those that may evolve
in the future.
3.   BINDING ARBITRATION FOR PUBLIC LAW DISPUTES
 As a practical matter, the Commission recognizes that not all
workplace disputes can be resolved through in-house, voluntary
dispute-resolution procedures. Rather, when voluntary procedures
fail, the parties must resort to a system which can provide a
final and binding decision. -Currently, as the Commission
discussed in the Fact Finding Report, the dominant mechanism for
securing binding adjudication of employees' public law grievances
is litigation in the federal and state court system.
 The Commission acknowledges that court litigation has become a
less-than-ideal method of resolving employees' public law claims.
As spelled out in the Fact Finding Report, employees bringing
public law claims in court must endure long waiting periods as
governing agencies and the overburdened court system struggle to
find time to properly investigate and hear the complaint.
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-Moreover, the average profile of employee litigants --
detailed in the Fact Finding Report -- indicates that lower-wage
workers may not fare as well as higher-wage professionals in the
litigation system; lower-wage workers are less able to afford the
time required to pursue a court complaint, and are less likely to
receive large monetary relief from juries.  Finally, the
litigation model of dispute resolution seems to be dominated by
“ex-employee” complainants, indicating that the litigation system
is less useful to employees who need redress for legitimate
complaints, but also wish to remain in their current jobs.
 For these reasons, the Commission believes that development of
private arbitration alternatives for workplace disputes must be
encouraged. -High-quality alternatives to litigation hold the
promise of expanding access to public law rights for lower-wage
workers. -Private arbitration may also allow even the most
contentious disputes to be resolved in a manner which permits the
complaining employee to raise the dispute without permanently
fracturing the employee's working relationship with the employer.
 In light of the important social values embodied in public
employment law and regulation, however, the Commission believes
that a shift to private alternatives must proceed carefully.
-Significant quality standards should be met by the private
arbitration mechanisms developed by individual firms and their
employees, to enhance the contributions they make to insuring
both protection of and respect for America's workforce.
(1) Quality Standards
 During the Commission's deliberations and hearings on workplace
arbitration, the Commission principally focused its attention on
the following question: what forms and methods of private
arbitration provide high-quality, fair and accurate results?
-In response to this inquiry, the Commission was pleased to see
a high degree of consensus,<Footnote:  Sept. 29, 1994 Testimony of
Mr. Arnold M. Zack, President, National Academy of Arbitrators and
Professor Samuel Estreicher.> -including among employer
groups,<Footnote: Testimony of the Labor Policy Association,
September 29, 1994.> regarding the quality standards necessary to
ensure effective protection of employees' substantive legal rights.
-In fact, both employers and employees agree that if private
arbitration is to serve as a legitimate form of private
enforcement of public employment law, these systems must provide:
 neutral arbitrator who knows the laws ---in question and
understands the concerns of the parties;
a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure the
necessary information to present his or her claim;
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a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and employee
to ensure affordable access to the system for all employees;
 the right to independent representation if the employee wants
it;
a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation;
a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for
the result; and
sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is
consistent with the governing laws.
At the same time, most commentators agreed that the imposition of
quality standards must not turn arbitration into a second court
system. -For arbitration to achieve its potential for providing
better and cheaper access to enforcement of employment
protections, costly and time-consuming legal mandates must be
avoided. -Moreover, if arbitration systems are to provide a
dispute resolution process more tailored to the specific needs of
a given worksite, quality standards must not require rigid
procedures that preclude continued experimentation with
arbitration design.
The Commission endorses this general consensus. -Meaningful
quality standards coupled with space for flexible experimentation
with low-cost procedures should guide employers designing
workplace arbitration systems. -In specific terms, the
Commission recommends the following guide posts for ensuring
quality in private arbitration:
 Selection of Arbitrator. -The selection process should
allow both the employer and the affected employee(s) to
participate. -The arbitrator should be selected from a roster
of qualified arbitrators who have training and experience in the
area of law disputed and are certified by professional
associations specializing in such dispute resolution.<Footnote: The
Commission encourages the various governing agencies responsible
for overseeing the processing of public law claims, such as the
EEOC or OSHA, to implement training programs for public law
arbitrators and to adopt standard training requirements to be
satisfied by arbitrators marketing their services for public law
dispute resolution.> Attention should be paid to ensuring that
professional rosters include women and minorities in significant
numbers. -Neither party should be able to limit the roster
unilaterally so as to risk the possibility that the arbitrator
finally selected will be biased in favor of that side.
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 Procedures. -Aggrieved employees should have the
opportunity to gather the relevant information they need to
support their legal claims. -Employees pursuing a claim, for
example, should be granted access to their personnel files.
-Broader access to personnel files should also be available for
workers bringing disparate impact or treatment claims.
-Workplace arbitration systems might also consider allowing a
complaining employee at least one deposition, or official
interview, of a company official of the employee's choosing.
-The arbitrator should be empowered to expand discovery to
include any material he or she finds valuable for resolving the
dispute.
 Payment of Arbitrator. -To ensure impartiality of the
arbitrator, both the employee and the employer should contribute
to the arbitrator's fee. -Ideally, the employee contribution
should be capped in proportion to the employee's pay, so as to
avoid discouraging claims by lower-wage workers.
Awards and Remedies.  The introduction of a workplace
arbitration system should not curb substantive employee
protections. -This means that private arbitration must offer
employees the same array of remedies available to them through
litigation in court. -Public law arbitrators should be
empowered to award whatever relief -- including reinstatement,
back pay, additional economic damages, punitive awards,
injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees --that would be available
in court under the law in question.
Final Arbitrator Ruling. -The arbitrator should issue a
written opinion spelling out the findings of fact and reasons
which led to the decision. -This opinion need not correspond in
style or length to a court opinion. -However, it should set out
in understandable terms the basis for the arbitrator's ruling.
 Court Review. -Judicial review of arbitrator rulings
must ensure that the arbitration decision reflects an appropriate
understanding and interpretation of the relevant legal doctrines.
-While a reviewing court should defer to an arbitrator's fact
findings as long as they have substantial evidentiary basis, the
reviewing court's authoritative interpretation of the law should
bind arbitrators as much it now binds administrative agencies and
lower courts. -For example, if an arbitration decision in
regard to a sexual harassment claim fails to grasp and apply the
standard set for such claims by the Supreme Court,<Footnote:
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).> the
reviewing court must overturn the arbitration decision as
inconsistent with current law.
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(2) Employee Participation in Workplace Arbitration
 Having set our the key requirements for high-quality
arbitration, the Commission now turns to the question of whether
-- with respect to an arbitration system which satisfies the
quality standards listed above -- an employee’s agreement to
arbitrate an employment law claim should be legally enforceable.
Growing out of the Gilmer decision, the Commission
recognizes, is a major debate over whether an employee may agree,
as a condition of employment, to be bound by an employer's
arbitration system.
 Testimony before the Commission indicated that a number of
employers have begun to implement private arbitration systems
into their employment contracts. In other words, employers
offering arbitration systems are often asking their employees to
agree to participate in the system — and thereby waive their
right to pursue a claim in court — when the employee agrees to
accept the job. -A number of lower courts have upheld these
types of arrangements on the basis of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gilmer.
The public rights embodied in state and federal employment law —
such as freedom from discrimination in the workplace and minimum
wage and overtime standards — are an important part of the social
and economic protections of the nation. -Employees required to
accept binding arbitration of such disputes would face what for
many would be an inappropriate choice:  give up your right to go
to court, or give up your job. -Private arbitration systems,
which we believe can work well if properly administered, will
have to prove themselves through experience before the nation is
in a position to decide whether employers should be allowed to
require their employees to use them as a condition of employment.
-We urge employers to experiment broadly with voluntary
programs so the nation can gain experience with this potentially
valuable tool.
(3) -Forbid Making Agreement to Arbitrate Public Law Claims
a Condition of Employment at This Time
 -Binding arbitration agreements should not be enforceable
as a condition of employment. -The Commission believes the
courts should interpret the Federal Arbitration Act in this
fashion. -If they fail to do, Congress should pass legislation
making it clear that any choice between available methods for
enforcing statutory employment rights should be left to the
individual who feels wronged rather than dictated by his or her
employment contract.<Footnote: With respect to the securities
industry, the Commission believes employees of securities firms
should not be required as a condition of employment to arbitrate
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disputes arising under federal or state employment laws.
-However, the Commission does not oppose traditional industry
requirements that employees agree to arbitrate other disputes,
such as those involving customers.> -At some time in the
future, as the nation gains experience with private arbitration
systems, it may wish to reevaluate the situation.
Encourage Employees to Consider Binding Arbitration of Claims
After They Have Arisen
 The Commission encourages employees whose employers offer
arbitration programs that meet the standards outlined above to
consider their use when a dispute occurs. -Employees who decide
to use a private arbitration system instead of going to court
after a dispute over a legal right has arisen should be bound by
the results of the arbitration decision subject to the limited
court review we specified above.
 In the longer run, the best way to ensure the acceptability to
workers of binding arbitration of their public law claims is to
afford employees an independent -voice in the design and
implementation of such programs. -For the present moment, the
Commission underlines its support for continuing experimentation
by private parties and government agencies with   low-cost,
high-quality alternatives to the court-based litigation system.
Indeed, the Commission predicts that as workplace arbitration
systems evolve and expand, both workers and employers will gain
experience and trust in such systems and in the mutually valuable
gains achieved through them. -The costs and time involved in
enforcing public employment rights through the court system are
increasingly denying a broader slice of American workers
meaningful access to employment law protections. -High-quality
private arbitration, the Commission believes, can provide both
workers and their employers with an attractive alternative.
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V.  Contingent Workers
 1.  GENERAL   OBSERVATIONS
     As employers seek new ways to make the employment
relationship more flexible, they have increasingly relied on
a variety of arrangements popularly known as "contingent
work."  The use of independent contractors and part-time,
temporary, seasonal, and leased workers has expanded
tremendously in recent years.  The Commission views this
change both as a healthy development and a cause for
concern.
On the positive side, contingent employment relationships
are in many respects a sensible response to today's
competitive global marketplace.  The benefits are clear that
 various forms of contingent work can offer to both some
management and some workers.  Contingent arrangements allow
some firms to maximize workforce flexibility in the face of
seasonal and cyclical forces and the demands of modern
methods such as just-in-time production.  This same
flexibility helps some workers, more of whom must balance
the demands of family and work as the numbers of dual-earner
and single-parent households rise.  Workers benefit when a
diversity of employment relationships is available.  For
example, temporary work provides a mechanism for transitions
between jobs, affording employers and workers an opportunity
to size each other up before deciding to enter into a more
stable employment relationship.  Manpower Incorporated CEO
Mitchell S. Fromstein told the Commission that his firm
transitioned approximately 150,000 "temps" into permanent
jobs with client companies in 1993 alone.<Footnote:
Statement of July 25, 1994, at 3.>
On the negative side, as the Fact Finding Report noted,
contingent arrangements may be introduced simply to reduce
the amount of compensation paid by the firm for the same
amount and value of work, which raises some serious social
questions.  This is particularly true because contingent
workers are drawn disproportionately from the most vulnera-
ble sectors of the workforce. They often receive less pay
and benefits than traditional full-time or "permanent"
workers, and they are less likely to benefit from the
protections of labor and employment laws.  A large percent-
age of workers who hold part-time or temporary positions do
so involuntarily.  The expansion of contingent work has
contributed to the increasing gap between high and low wage
workers and to the increasing sense of insecurity among
workers noted in the Fact Finding Report, (pp. 93-94).
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Unfortunately, current tax, labor and employment law gives
employers and employees incentives to create contingent
relationships not for the sake of flexibility or efficiency
but in order to evade their legal obligations.  For example,
an employer and a worker may see advantages wholly unrelated
to efficiency or flexibility in treating the worker as an
independent contractor rather than an employee.  The
employer will not have to make contributions to Social
Security, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and
health insurance, will save the administrative expense of
withholding, and will be relieved of responsibility to the
worker under labor and employment laws.  The worker will
lose the protection of those laws and benefits and the
employer's contribution to Social Security, but may accept
the arrangement nonetheless because it gives him or her an
opportunity for immediate and even illegitimate financial
gains through underpayment of taxes. Many low-wage workers
have no practical choice in the matter.  The federal govern-
ment loses billions of dollars to underpayment of taxes by
workers misclassified as independent contractors. A 1989 GAO
study found that 38 percent of the employers examined
misclassified employees as independent contractors.
<Footnote:  GAO/GGD-89-107 Misclassification of Workers, 2.
See Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of
Representatives, "The Administration and Enforcement of
Employment Taxes--A Status Report on Ideas for Change,"
1994. Also see, Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation, Misclassification of Workers as Independent
Contractors, November 1994.>  A June 1994 study conducted by
the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand estimates that revenue
loss due to misclassification will total $3.3 billion
annually by 1996.<Footnote:  "Projection of the Loss in
Federal Tax Revenues due to Misclassification of Workers,"
submitted July 25, 1994 by the Coalition for Fair Worker
Classification.>
The Commission does not believe these problems render
contingent forms of work inherently illegitimate.  On the
contrary, we affirm the valuable role contingent arrange-
ments can play in diversifying the forms of employment
relationship available to meet the needs of American
companies and workers.  The goal of public policy should be
to remove incentives to use them for illegitimate purposes.
 We believe the changes in labor and employment law
discussed below will make a contribution toward achieving
this goal.
 2.  RECOMMENDATIONS
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In light of the considerations discussed above, we make
recommendations regarding contingent workers in two areas:
(1)  The definition of employee in labor, employment, and
tax law should be modernized, simplified, and standardized.
 Instead of the control test borrowed from the old common
law of master and servant, the definition should be based on
the economic realities underlying the relationship between
the worker and the party benefiting from the worker's
services.
(2)  The definition of employer should also be standardized
and grounded in the economic realities of the employment
relationship.  Congress and the NLRB should remove the
incentives that now exist for firms to use variations in
corporate form to avoid responsibility for the people who do
their work.
The Commission received a number of other proposals about
contingent work, many of which merit serious attention.  We
devoted a hearing to the subject on July 25, 1994.  A
working group of the Commission held a round table
discussion with ten groups representing low wage workers on
October 7, 1994.  On both occasions, we heard testimony
about the plight of people on the lowest rungs of the
employment ladder.  More workers now find themselves in
contingent employment relationships than ever before.
Among the ideas advanced in these forums and in written
submissions to the Commission were expanding the coverage of
various statutes to seasonal workers; affording farm workers
the protections of the NLRA; mandating equal pay for equal
work as well as equal benefits on a pro-rata basis for part-
time employees; giving employees of contractors a right of
first refusal when they are displaced because their employer
loses a contract for ongoing services; and putting a time
limit on temporary positions, so that they would convert to
regular employee positions with the client firm after a
specified time period.
The Commission takes no position on these proposals.
 Frankly, it is beyond our means to recommend a full policy
program in this emerging area of concern.  However, we wish
to emphasize the importance of  a comprehensive study
<Footnote:  The Bureau of  Labor Statistics announced on
December 9, l994 its first comprehensive survey of the
contingent workforce as a supplement to the current
population survey, the results to be available in June
l995.> to develop a balanced public policy to mediate the
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concerns of flexibility and productivity on the one hand and
economic security and fairness on the other.
 1.  The Definition of Employee
The single most important factor in determining which
workers are covered by employment and labor statutes is the
way the line is drawn between employees and independent
contractors. Each labor and employment law statute covers
only those it defines as employees.  The statutes do not
protect others, notably independent contractors.  When one
thinks of an independent contractor relationship, one
normally thinks of one firm hiring a second firm--with its
own staff, equipment, and resources--  to do certain work,
instead of having its own employees do it.  The problems
arise when the first firm hires not another firm but a
single or several individuals to do work, and then wishes to
treat those individuals as independent contractors rather
than as employees.  There are two major problems with the
definition of employee in current labor and employment law:
(1) each statute makes the distinction in its own way,
presenting employers with an unnecessarily complicated
regulatory maze; (2) in substance, the law is based on a
nineteenth century  concept whose purposes are wholly
unrelated to contemporary employment policy.
The NLRA, the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act þ each
major labor and employment statute -- has its own definition
of employee and its own way of drawing the line between
employees and independent contractors.  Many of these
definitions appear to be quite similar.  But they were
created over a period of a half century, and their language
is often vague or circular, leaving them open to a broad
range of interpretations.  As a result, the line has been
drawn differently in the different statutes, depending on
the inclinations of the agency at the time or Supreme Court
doing the drawing.  These differences in interpretation mean
that a worker might be deemed an employee for purposes of
the FLSA but an independent contractor for purposes of the
NLRA, without any apparent policy justification for the
disparity of treatment.  The Commission finds no principled
justification for this regulatory morass.
As for the substance of the definition of employee, the
legal debate has been framed from the beginning by the
common law distinction between an employee and independent
contractor.  This nineteenth century concept was created by
judges for purposes such as determining when a "master"
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should be held liable for torts committed by a "servant."
 The doctrine emphasizes the degree of control the master
has over the servant, on the theory that a person with
little control over the actions of another should not be
liable for them.  Over the years, the doctrine has grown
highly formalistic, to the point that the IRS, which uses a
version of it for determining tax liability, employs 20
factors in drawing the employee/independent contractor
line.<Footnote:  Internal Revenue Manual, 4600 Employment
Tax Procedure, Exhibit 4640-1.>  Given the proliferation of
factors making up the test, its application often yields
inconsistent results.  What is more, its formalism provides
employers and workers with a means and incentive to
circumvent the employment policies of the nation.  Whatever
the actual nature of their relationship, an employer and
worker can structure it on paper to give the latter indepen-
dent contractor rather than employee status.
While some statutes, notably the FLSA,<Footnote:  See U.S.
v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).> have diverged from the
traditional independent contractor test, others, such as the
NLRA,<Footnote:  NLRB v. United Insurance Company of
America, 390 U.S. 256 (1968).>  follow it closely.  Two
years ago, the Supreme Court gave the test new life in the
case of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v.
Darden.<Footnote:  112 S.Ct. 1344 (1992).>  The Darden Court
concluded that ERISA's definition of employee was
meaningless.  To solve this problem, the Court held that
when Congress fails to define a term that has a settled
meaning at common law, courts should infer that Congress
meant to adopt the common  law definition.  Thus, under
ERISA an employee means a worker under the direct control of
the employer þ i.e., one who is not a common law independent
contractor.  Darden has already begun to reverberate in the
employment law field well beyond ERISA.<Footnote:  Some
lower courts have decided they must apply the common law
test to Title VII as well as ERISA.  See, e.g., Lattanzio v.
Security National Bank, 825 F.Supp. 86 (E.D.Pa. 1993)
(expressly disregarding the Third Circuit's previous
reliance on another test).>
 (1) Streamline and Modernize the Definition of Employee
The Commission concludes that the ancient doctrine of master
and servant provides a poor vehicle for delivering federal
employment policy into the twenty-first century.  The law in
this area should be modernized and streamlined: there is no
need for every federal employment and labor statute to have
its own definition of employee.  We recommend that Congress
adopt a single, coherent concept of employee and apply it
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across the board in employment and labor law.
 (2) Use an Economic Realities Test to Determine Who is an
Employee
The determination of whether a worker is an employee
protected by federal labor and employment law should not be
based on the degree of immediate control the employer
exercises over the worker, but rather on the underlying eco-
nomic realities of the relationship.  Workers should be
treated as independent contractors if they are truly
independent entrepreneurs performing services for clients þ
i.e., if they present themselves to the general public as an
established business presence, have a number of clients,
bear the economic risk of loss from their work, and the
like.
Workers who are economically dependent on the entity for
whom they perform services generally should be treated as
employees.  Factors such as low wages, low skill levels, and
having one or few employers should all militate against
treatment as an independent contractor.  A revised test
based on the economic realities of the work relationship
will eliminate the incentives to use the independent
contractor form to evade the obligations of national
workplace policy while leaving it fully available where its
use is truly appropriate.
In order to create a consistent and rational policy on the
definition of employees, Congress should change the tax law
as well.  Even if the definition of employee is simplified
and standardized across employment and labor law, tax law
will continue to present a significant incentive for
misclassification if it goes unchanged.  Two reforms are
necessary in this area.  First, Congress should apply an
economic realities test for determining who is an employee
to the Internal Revenue Code as well as to employment and
labor law.  Second, Congress should strengthen the IRS's
ability to make sure employers and workers draw the line
properly, whatever the test.
Currently, employers decide whether their workers are
employees or independent contractors with little scrutiny
from the IRS.  Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 ties
the IRS's hands in attempting to deter misclassification.
 Section 530 prevents the IRS from collecting back taxes
from an employer who misclassified its employees as
independent contractors þ or even from requiring the
employer to reclassify the workers as employees þ if any of
three conditions are met: the employer's classification
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follows judicial precedent or IRS rulings; the
classification is based on long-standing industry practice;
or the employer has been audited by the IRS in the past
without being assessed for the misclassification.
The past audit rule is indefensible as a matter of policy,
because there is no requirement that the past audit looked
into employment taxation.  Thus, even if the employer was
audited for something totally unrelated to the classifica-
tion question, and the other two justifications for
providing a safe harbor do not apply, the employer is free
to misclassify employees indefinitely and avoid paying taxes
it properly owes without penalty.
(3) Eliminate the "Past Audit" Safe Harbor for
Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors
Congress should reform Section 530 to permit the IRS to
require an employer to reclassify an employee for the future
any time the agency discovers an improper classification,
regardless of past audits, if the employer's classification
cannot be justified on the basis of accepted industry
practice or tax law precedent.  In addition, the IRS should
be able to reclassify the employee for a limited period,
such as up to three years into the past, if the agency has
not audited the employer on the classification issue during
that period.
2.   The Definition of Employer
The definition of employer plays a role similar to the
definition of employee in labor and employment law. Each
statute sets out a definition of the employer concept which
limits the scope of the statute's coverage by determining
which entities are liable as employers and which are not.
 As with the employee concept, the employer definition
varies from statute to statute. We believe it should be
standardized and modernized in order to allow free play for
mutually rewarding contingent relationships while
eliminating incentives to create contingent relationships
merely to evade legal obligations.
 As a general rule, the definitions of employer are premised
on a model of employment relations in which one set of
employees is engaged in a continuing relationship with one
enterprise.  Thus, many federal statutes limit employer
status to those parties responsible for hiring or firing,
setting schedules, or actually issuing the worker's
paycheck.  This model of the employment relationship is
badly out of date, not least because it fails to account for
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the extent to which contingent work arrangements have become
commonplace rather than marginal in our society.  Many
thousands of workers are now employed by one firm but
actually provide services for another as temporary, leased,
or contract employees, and these relationships are often of
short duration.  Federal law should welcome this change,
while ensuring that contingent relationships are established
for the purposes of efficiency and flexibility, not to evade
workplace standards.
As the law now stands, the narrow definition of employer
found in most employment and labor statutes gives firms
incentives to create contingent relationships not for the
sake of flexibility and efficiency, but to reduce the number
of workers with access to collective bargaining and
protections as to the minimum wage, overtime, pensions,
benefits and the like.  For example, Corporation A can
create a subsidiary,  Corporation B, and transfer to it work
formerly done by Corporation A employees merely to avoid a
collective bargaining agreement, as long as Corp. B has
separate management and control over labor relations.
The incentives to use contingent forms to cut corners lead
to harmful outcomes for American employers, workers, and
society at large.  Law abiding employers are undercut by
contractors who can offer cheap services by avoiding minimum
wage, Social Security, un-employment insurance, and other
obligations. The economic security of workers is eroded,
because the number of temporary and contract jobs is
artificially inflated by socially harmful "cost savings."
 Many workers at the bottom of the employment ladder suffer
under conditions that violate national standards of decency.
 For example, the GAO recently reported that sweatshops
continue to be a major problem in the garment
industry.<Footnote:  United States General Accounting
Office, Garment Industry: Efforts to Address the Prevalence
and Conditions of Sweatshops, Nov. 1994 (GAO/HEHS-95-29).>
 The incentives to use contingent arrangements to avoid
employment obligations create an unnecessary enforcement
burden that state and federal governments are unable to bear
and for which taxpayers should not have to pay.
The Commission believes the solution to this problem is not
to reduce the ability of the buyers and sellers of labor to
experiment with all manner of contingent relationships, but
rather to remove the incentives to use those arrangements in
ways that undercut national employment standards.  In light
of this policy, we make the following recommendations.
(4)  Modernize and Standardize the Definition of Employer
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Based on Economic Realities
The definition of employer in statutes across the employment
and labor law spectrum should be changed and made uniform in
a way that reflects the economic realities of the relation-
ship between providers and recipients of services.
(5) Expand "Single Employer" Doctrine
"Single employer" doctrine should be expanded so that firms
do not have incentives to use variations in the corporate
form to avoid workplace responsibilities.  In general, a
grouping of parent, subsidiary, sibling, and spin-off
entities should be considered a single employer of  their
respective employees.<Footnote:  One illustration of  the
single employer problem arising under labor law is the
"double-breasted" contractor arrangement in the construction
industry.  A unionized contractor may establish a related or
subsidiary contractor to do essentially the same kind of
construction work but to do it nonunion, even though the
firm was bound by a collective agreement through the
original corporate entity.  The Supreme Court has concluded
that the current definition of employer under the NLRA is
broad enough for the NLRB to hold the two corporate entities
to be a single employer.  South Prairie Construction Co. v.
Operating Engineers Local 627, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
 However, the Board generally has continued to treat the
operations of related corporate entities in the construction
field as separate bargaining units, with the unit designated
by the firm as nonunion not having to meet the employment
standards called for in the collective bargaining agreement.
 The Commission received extensive submissions on this
issue.  We recommend that the Board revisit the question of
whether its policy continues to be appropriate in light of
the Commission's broader judgments about the single employer
doctrine.> In this area, the Internal Revenue Code can serve
as a model for labor and employment law.<Footnote:  See 26
U.S.C. _414.>
(6) Expand "Joint Employer" Doctrine as to Safety and Health
and Client Cancellation of Contracts
"Joint employer" doctrine should also be expanded, but not
in a way that makes clients responsible for the actions of
contractors over whose operations and employees they  have
little control.  In client-provider  relationships, the
client firm should be liable to the provider firm's
employees in two particular areas.  First, because of the
crucial importance of  occupational safety and health, the
client should be responsible for ensuring that its
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contractors meet the relevant legal standards regarding
unsafe conditions or practices to which the workers may be
exposed.  Second, the client should be liable if its own
decisions or actions with respect to the contract serve to
deny the workers their legal rights under labor-relations
law. .<Footnote:  Thus, it should be a violation of the
labor law for a client whose contractor's employees vote to
unionize to terminate the contract as a result, since the
client has effectively eliminated the employees' ability to
choose collective bargaining.  Indeed, the prospect of such
a contract termination by an anti-union client þ the risk of
which the contractor can draw to the attention of its
employees during the representation campaign þ may prove a
significant deterrent to the contractor's employees
exercising their legal right to bargain collectively.>
The Commission also encourages the NLRB to use its rule
making and adjudication processes to establish a fair
doctrine governing joint-employer situations.
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VI.  Regulatory Overview:  Employment Law Programs
1.   INTRODUCTION
The Fact Finding Report, in Chapter IV (pp. 105-137)
presents an account of the rapid growth of federal and state
employment legislation, creating individual rights for
workers.  In some cases, employment law  has also created
forms of collective rights at the workplace, such as rights
to a safe and healthy workplace or to freedom from an
atmosphere of sexual harassment.  These rights  relate to
the situation confronting a group of workers rather than an
individual worker.
At the same time, many state courts have transformed their
traditional hands-off posture towards employment at will
into a measure of legal protection against wrongful
dismissal.
Enforcement of these employment laws against non-complying
employers requires litigation in federal or state courts or
administrative proceedings before regulatory agencies.
 Employment law cases filed in the federal district courts
in the two decades 1971-1991 increased more than four-old,
and there was also a rapid expansion of suits in the state
courts  seeking redress for wrongful dismissal or
discrimination.
There has seldom, if ever,  been a systematic overview of
this statutory structure and the resulting detailed
regulations and court interpretations that flow from
employment law.  Congress and its committees have considered
the legislation piecemeal.  Administrative agencies
generally consider regulatory, interpretive and procedural
issues separately, even in the case of similar issues that
arise in different agencies of the same Department.  Courts
review individual cases.  Labor organizations tend to focus
on those regulations that affect their members in separate
workplaces.  Employers in different sectors, of different
sizes, and with different problems are affected in quite
different ways, although employers and their organizations
probably have the broadest overview.  The whole field has
become far too large and complex for independent researchers
who tend to specialize in single issues or
agencies.<Footnote:United States General Accounting Office,
Workplace Regulation, Information on Selected Employer and
Union Experiences, Vol. I and II, Washington, D.C., June,
1994.  The study was requested by the House Committee on
Education and Labor, both the majority and minority
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members.>
2.   SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM
The Commission heard a variety of complaints about the
present system of enforcement of employment law through
litigation in federal or state courts or administrative
proceedings before regulatory agencies. Among these problems
are the following:
(1)  Despite the fact that a number of recent statutes have
encouraged alternative methods of dispute resolution in
federal employment statutes, both administrative and
judicial backlogs have sharply risen.<Footnote:See, for
example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990; the Judicial
Improvement Act of 1990, Title I; the Civil Rights Reform
Act of 1991; and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.>
 The EEOC, for instance, reports an inventory of nearly
97,000 complaints in FY 1994 pending charges.  This figure
represents a backlog of 18.8 months, a sharp increase from
the prior year's 12.2 months.<Footnote:Data supplied to the
Commission by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
from the Office of Communication and Legislative Affairs,
from EEOC's Charges Data System's (CDS) Automated District
Office Report, November 1994.>  Such large backlogs and
delays frustrate the purposes of the legislation for all
parties.
(2)  The access to protections for low wage employees is
particularly constrained by the high costs of litigation.
Employment litigation tends to be much more utilized by
managerial and other higher paid employees as compared to
low-wage employees, creating significant inequities.
(3)  In highly competitive sectors, particularly those with
high labor costs, lack of compliance with employment
standards prescribed by law results in uneven treatment of
workers and unfair competitive advantages for violators who
undermine the socially determined standards.<Footnote:The
minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA enacted
in the 1930s were in large measure designed to level the
playing field on which manufacturers in different parts of
the country could compete fairly and equitably.  Inadequate
enforcement and uneven compliance had undermined this basic
social and economic purpose of the legislation.  See, U.S.
General Accounting Office, Garment Industry, Efforts to
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Address the Prevalence and Conditions of Sweatshops,
November 1994.>
(4)  The compliance officer and investigator staff of the
Department of Labor's regulatory agencies have declined, as
measured by full-time equivalents (FTEs), over the past 15
years, at the same time as statutory requirements have
expanded and the cases have increased.  Projections for
future enforcement staff are likely to show further declines
as agencies implement their "streamlining" plans, which call
for a reduction of 12 percent in FTE levels for FY 1999.
Similarly, the EEOC, since 1990, has seen its investigators
decline in the face of a substantial increase in caseloads.
 As a result the average caseload per EEOC investigator has
increased  from 51.3 in FY 1990 to 122.0 in FY
1994.<Footnote:See footnote 3 above.>
The attached table reports changes in the investigative
staffs for various Department of Labor agencies, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board for the years 1980, 1990 and 1994.
(5)  A number of employer-based dispute resolution systems
are being established by some employers in nonunion
workplaces þ often as a condition of employment þ to respond
to the expansion in litigation and costs.  Many of these
unilaterally established systems do not meet the test of
fairness in one or more respects.  It is essential at this
stage in the development of such workplace-based dispute
resolution systems to define structures that are inherently
fair and thus can gain wide acceptance among employees and
the general public.(see Section IV above.)
Neither the existing administrative and litigation routes
nor the early ventures into private workplace-based dispute
systems seem to provide what is really needed.  To be
effective, a system for resolving disputes about labor
standards must settle claims fairly, close to the workplace,
at an early stage, in a manner consistent with law and
public policy, and with  direct involvement of the disputing
parties rather than through litigation much later with legal
representation, and with higher transaction costs.  In
particular, disputing parties need to achieve early and
direct settlement if they are to continue to work together
productively.  Absent an effective dispute resolution
system, litigation tends to lead to the departure of the
employee, regardless of the legal verdict.
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3.   DOL AGENCY CASE MANAGEMENT AND ADJUDUCATION PROCEDURES
The Department of Labor is responsible for administering
approximately 180 statutes.  These statutes have been
enacted over many years, beginning in the 1930s with the
Davis-Bacon (DBA), Walsh-Healey (PCA), and Fair Labor
Standards Acts (FLSA).  Over the years, new statutory
responsibilities were added, including the Service Contract
Act (SCA), the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), to name some of the major laws.
With enactment of these statutes, Congress typically
mandated different enforcement and penalty structures, thus
requiring the Department to establish different case
handling and adjudication procedures to administer different
statutes.  Currently, there are approximately 20 major
adjudication procedures and a considerable number of minor
procedures in operation at the Department.
The procedures for OSHA are illustrative of the
administration of a major labor statute.  (Unlike the Wage
and Hour Act, however, individual employees are not
authorized to institute court cases under OSHA.)  In FY
1993, OSHA initiated 39,723 inspections and investigations.
 These were either programmed (selected in advance using a
system targeting) or unprogrammed (due to imminent danger,
fatality, catastrophe, referrals of a follow-up
inspection).<Footnote:An employer can refuse the OSHA
compliance officer entry.  If refused entry, OSHA must get
an inspection warrant through the U.S. District Court.>  As
a result of these inspections, which took an average of 48
days, OSHA issued 29,189 citations.
Upon receipt of the citation, the employer may request an
informal conference with the Area Director within 15 days of
receipt, and then enter into an "informal settlement
agreement."  In FY 1993, OSHA entered into 15, 697 informal
settlements with employers.  Alternatively, the employer may
contest the citation within 15 working days by filing a
"Notice of Contest."  In FY 1993, 2,974 such Notices were
filed.
Following the Notice of Contest, any subsequent settlement
agreement that OSHA enters into with the employer is a
"Formal Settlement Agreement."  Such agreements may be
negotiated at any point following the Notice of Contest and
may even be concluded during the litigation
process.<Footnote:OSHA (and other DOL agencies) at this
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point in the process may also enter into a "Corporate-Wide
Settlement Agreement" with an employer, which would include
in the settlement worksites other than the one actually
inspected.>  Typically, between 80 to 85 percent of
contested cases are resolved by formal settlement
agreements.
If the parties fail to resolve the case through a Formal
Settlement Agreement, the case proceeds to an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) for Hearing.  The Notice of Contest is also
transmitted to the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC), which awaits the outcome of the ALJ
hearing.  In FY 1993, 191 cases proceeded to the ALJ hearing
stage.  Following the hearing before the ALJ, which takes an
average of 12 months from assignment to completion, the
Judge will issue a decision and file it with the Commission.
Once the ALJ decision has been filed with the Commission
there is a 30-day period during which any aggrieved party
may request a review of the Judge's decision by the Review
Commission.  During FY 1993, 77 cases were directed for
review, taking an average of 15.5 months to complete.
Following a decision by the Review Commission, parties may
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals within 60 days.  There
were 31 appeals requested in FY 1993, with judicial review
taking an average of nine months.  An aggrieved party may
seek further review by the U.S. Supreme Court within 90 days
after the entry of mandate by the lower court.
This OSHA administrative and adjudication process provides
one illustration of the procedures used by DOL in the
administration of labor statutes.  There are, however, a
number of other major statutes administered by the
Department, most with their own processes for dispute
resolution.  For example, the Employment Standards
Administration (ESA) lists different procedures for each of
its 12 "significant areas" in which the Wage and Hour
Division has labor standards enforcement responsibility.
These are:  (1) FLSA minimum wage and overtime; (2) FLSA
child labor; (3) Wage and debarment provisions of Davis
Bacon and Related Acts (4) Wage and debarment provisions of
SCA and Walsh-Healey; (5) Family and Medical Leave Act; (6)
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (7)
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) H-1A (alien
registered nurses); (8) IRCA-H-1B (professionals and fashion
models "of particular merit"); (9) IRCA H-2A (temporary
foreign agricultural workers); (10) IRCA D-1 (alien crew
members performing longshore work in U.S. ports); (11) IRCA
F-1 (foreign students working off-campus); and (12) seven
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environmental whistle blower protection statutes.
In addition to OSHA and ESA, there are three other major DOL
regulatory agencies that have administrative procedures
unique to their statutes:
(a)  The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has
procedures that, in many ways, are similar to those of OSHA,
including a review commission that hears appeals from ALJ
decisions.  MSHA's procedures, however, have many
distinctive features and handle a much higher caseload of
approximately 160,000 citations and 16,000 contested actions
annually.
(b)  The Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA)
which administers the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, conducted approximately 3500 investigations in FY 1994,
leading to roughly 650 cases involving violations.  Of this
number, 128 were referred for litigation.  It is noteworthy
that PWBA cases tend to be larger, more complex, and more
costly to litigate than cases from other DOL agencies.
(c)  The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which
administers anti-discrimination cases arising from Executive
Order 11246, Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, also has its own sets of
administrative and adjudicatory procedures.
The number and complexity of statutes, regulations and
procedures administered by the Department is striking. These
diverse administrative procedures may themselves be a
contributing factor to the complexity of workplace dispute
resolution.
4.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING AND RESOLVING REGULATORY
DISPUTES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PROGRAMS
The enormity of the regulatory task and the limited
resources available to the Department raise a fundamental
question.  Either these agencies need to be provided
additional funding to meet the standards and methods of
compliance prescribed when the statutes were enacted, or the
scope of those expectations and the reach of the regulations
be reduced, as well as new methods of regulation and
compliance be developed.  Until these basic choices of
national policy are more generally determined, the following
are areas in which the Commission makes recommendations as
to directions that can be implemented in the near term.
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(1)  Expand the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking
A first step in avoiding litigation is to develop better
regulations.  Negotiated rulemaking (or "reg-neg") is a
process that brings together those who would be
significantly affected by a rule, including the Government,
to reach consensus on some or all of its provisions before
the rule is published as a proposal for public comment.  The
process is voluntary, and the participants establish their
own rules of procedure.  An impartial mediator is used to
facilitate intensive discussion among the participants,
whose committee hearings are open to the public.  Agreements
that emerge from this process tend to be more technically
accurate, clear and specific, and less likely to be
challenged in litigation than are rules produced without
such interaction.  Reg-neg offers DOL an opportunity to
avoid conflicts and disputes in the labor standards area
long before they arise as compliance problems.
Reg-neg requires certain up front costs (for travel,
mediation, etc.) and may be perceived as a slower process
than traditional notice and comment.  The end results,
however, can improve the effectiveness of the rulemaking
process.  In addition to saving time and money that might
otherwise be spent in litigation, regulations developed
through the active participation of all interested parties
are generally easier to administer and enforce.  The use of
reg-neg in the development of regulations, or in their
review and revision, can make a significant contribution to
reducing litigation.
Through the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (Public Law
101-648) Congress has fully authorized and endorsed this
process.  Despite the encouragement of this statute to
reduce recourse to the administrative agencies and the
courts, these procedures have been used rarely with respect
to  employment law.  (Fact Finding Report pp. 124-125.)
The Department of Labor reports that since the early
development of these procedures in 1975-1976, there have
been only two attempts at negotiated rulemaking and a third
is now in process.  These three efforts all concern OSHA
standards.<Footnote:See letter of October 31, 1994 from
Secretary Reich to the Administrative Conference of the
United States, Attachment 7.>  The first of these efforts in
1983 to 1984 regarding the benzene standard was not
successful.  The second, on MDA (Methylenedianiline), began
in 1985 and resulted in a published rule in 1992.  This rule
is one of the few OSHA rules not to be seriously challenged
in the courts: in fact, the industry began to comply
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voluntarily years before the final standard was published.
 In December 1992, OSHA announced a negotiated rulemaking
process concerning safety requirements for the erection of
steel structures in construction.  That reg-neg process is
currently underway.<Footnote:The Department should consider
whether the current organizational structure for reg-neg is
the most efficient.  Currently, the Assistant Secretary for
Policy and Budget has the lead on the use of mediation and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), while
the Solicitor of Labor has the lead on negotiated
rulemaking.  ADR and reg-neg are closely related programs
that seek to avoid and solve disputes on an informal basis,
without resorting to litigation.>
As the Fact Finding Report (pp. 124-125) noted, greater use
of negotiated rulemaking will require different attitudes
and skills from both interested parties and the agency staff
than the traditional adversarial processes that tend to end
in the courts, with delays and far greater expense to the
government, the regulated community and other interested
parties.
There have been sections of employment law that have been
hotly contested for years that would benefit even now from
negotiated rulemaking.  For example, the unsuccessful
efforts of the Wage and Hour Division since the 1970s to
update its regulations governing the minimum wage and
overtime pay exemption for executive, administrative and
professional staff (29 CFR Part 541) þ in particular,
changes to the salary "docking" rule þ have resulted in the
current state of conflict and confusion among both private
employers and municipal officials.  This issue was
specifically referred to on a number of occasions in
testimony and presentations to the Commission.  It has also
arisen in the Task Force on Excellence in State and Local
Government.  The problems are clearly appropriate for prompt
resort to forms of negotiated rulemaking.<Footnote:See, 1994
Regulatory Plan for the Department of Labor, Federal
Register, November 14, 1994.  It is estimated that 23
million workers are within the scope of these regulations.>
The Commission recommends that the Secretary consider
 application of reg-neg to this  long-standing and critical
regulatory issue.
The Commission is pleased to learn from the October 31, 1994
letter of Secretary Reich to the Administrative Conference
of the United States that the Department's policy is that
"Negotiated rulemaking shall be actively considered for use
by all of the Department's agencies."  This policy needs to
be implemented and reinforced  even within existing budgets.
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 To do so, the Department first needs to establish
negotiated rulemaking as the standard process for drafting
regulations that are significant, controversial and complex,
and then implement internal regulatory procedures that
institutionalize this approach.<Footnote: Substantial
support for this approach is found in Recommendation REG03
"Encouraging Consensus-Based Rulemaking" of the National
Performance Review report, pp. 29-33.>
The Department should also work with the Administrative
Conference of the United States in developing appropriate
changes to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act to make it easier
for regulatory agencies to use reg-neg.  The current law
sunsets in 1996, and any legislative amendments in a
reauthorization could have a significant impact on the
ability of DOL and the other regulatory agencies to make
expanded use of this technique.<Footnote: For example, the
current law requires that all reg-neg committees be
chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).
 This provision creates significant and time-consuming
administrative tasks for agencies that choose to use reg-
neg.  The statutes should be amended to eliminate this
requirements, while retaining the important public
safeguards that are intended by application of FACA.
 Similarly, changes are needed to streamline the lengthy
task for agencies of procuring the services of
facilitators.>
(2)  Improve Information and  Compliance Assistance
A second major step to avoiding labor standards disputes is
to insure that employers and employees are fully informed of
what is required under existing regulations and what
constitutes acceptable compliance.  The GAO, in its Report
on Workplace Regulation, found that even the larger
employers they surveyed were not confident that they knew
all of the rules that applied to their business operations.
Likewise, union officials noted their own lack of knowledge
about some regulatory areas and indicated that all too often
workers were unaware of their rights.<Footnote:See GAO
Report on Workplace Regulation June 1994, Vol. 1, p. 57.>
The Department needs to provide clearer guidance as to what
is required and how one might best comply.  Such guidance is
particularly important since so many business establishments
are small or medium sized (employing fewer than 250
employees) with limited resources to follow the complexities
of federal regulations.  The Commission believes that a
major step that DOL can take to promote compliance and
reduce regulatory disputes is to provide the business and
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labor communities, as well as the general public, with clear
and comprehensive information on regulatory requirements.
The Commission specifically recommends that the Department
establish electronic regulatory information and compliance
assistance systems.  Such systems would provide interested
parties with greatly improved access to information on all
applicable statutes, regulations, case law, or opinion
letters.  The technology now exists to make such information
"user friendly"; and even to tailor such information to the
needs of individual users.<Footnote: The rapid growth in
technology with respect to "expert systems" illustrates this
point.  Such systems are now available in such complex areas
as tax preparation.  Indeed, OSHA has developed an "expert
system" in conjunction with its Cadmium Standard, which
includes a number of complex requirements.>  The Commission
recognizes that some modest groundwork has begun.  It
applauds such efforts as OSHA's Computerized Information
System (OCIS).  It also notes that the Department is already
operating a public information "bulletin board" that
provides some regulatory compliance assistance information þ
such as the text of MSHA's regulations and its Program
Policy Manual.  What is required, however, is a
comprehensive system that provides complete information on
the Department's most generally applicable regulatory
requirements, follow on interpretations, and the
availability of compliance assistance materials.
(3)  Promote Self-Regulation
Further, the Department needs to focus its attention on
assisting the development of processes that provide
workplace-based dispute resolution programs that are
consistent with law and public policy, inexpensive,
effective and fair to all parties.  In the 1960s and 1970s,
the Department's Wage and Hour Division operated a voluntary
self-audit program named "Compliance Utilizing Education" or
the "CUE" program.  Approximately 100 large firms
participated in this program under which DOL conducted
training seminars for personnel officials of the company who
then audited their firm's compliance with wage and hour
regulations.
Employers participated in the CUE program because they
sought to avoid unintentional systemic violations that might
create liabilities for the firm.  Employees were offered an
informal workplace-based forum for resolving complaints,
while retaining the option of raising their complaint
directly to Wage and Hour on a confidential basis.  CUE
firms generally were not scheduled for investigation absent
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employee complaints.<Footnote: Some labor standards do not
lend themselves to employer-employee informal settlements
because the legal standard or public policy may not fit the
interests of either party.  For example, if a 17-year old is
employed illegally as a driver delivering pizza, neither the
employer nor employee may have an interest in seeing the law
enforced.  These situations are limited to a relatively
small number of DOL regulations..>
Despite its success, the CUE program was terminated because
of the perception that the Wage and Hour Division was
abandoning its enforcement obligations.  The underlying
principle of the program was that employers and employees
should directly resolve wage and hour regulatory issues
among themselves, with the Department providing employees a
higher level of appeals.
The Commission would endorse efforts by the Department to
assist employers, workers, and unions with training and
technical assistance that will allow them to establish
workplace-based systems to resolve regulatory disputes.  The
Commission also believes that the Department should remain
as an avenue of appeal for workplace disputes that leave
problems unsolved.
The clear benefit of such a system is that it will resolve
more regulatory disputes in the workplace itself, while
still providing the employee with recourse to a neutral
agency where satisfactory resolution of the problem on the
job is not forthcoming.  To the degree direct settlements
are reached, the Department benefits by increasing
compliance without using scarce enforcement resources.
 (4) Expand the Use of ADR
Following enactment of the ADR Act in November 1990, the
Department of Labor took a number of small but significant
steps to implement informal processes of resolving disputes.
For example, the Office of Administrative Law Judges issued
regulations that established a voluntary "settlement judge"
process for cases referred to ALJs.  The Employment and
Training Administration started a pilot project using
mediation to resolve grant and contract debt collection
cases.  The Office of Civil Rights initiated an ADR pilot
test for EEO complaints by DOL employees.
Most importantly, in 1992 DOL experimented with the use of
in-house mediators in cases involving OSHA and Wage-Hour
violations in the Philadelphia Region.<Footnote: The
Philadelphia ADR pilot test is documented in Report to the
Secretary of Labor on the Philadelphia ADR Pilot Project,
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(October 1992) and Marilynn L. Schuyler, A Cost Analysis of
the Department of Labor's Philadelphia ADR Pilot Project,
(August 1993).  It is also cited in the National Performance
Review as a significant accomplishment and recommended
expansion of the process to all DOL regions.>  In this
pilot, 27 cases referred to litigation were selected for
mediation.  Of these cases, 22 (81% ) were settled, most at
a single mediation session.  Some of the cases were very
complex and would have cost DOL and the outside party
substantial time and resources had they been brought to
trial.  It is noteworthy that all the parties to these
settlements expressed satisfaction with the outcomes.
The Commission applauds the work that the Department has
done to date, but strongly urges that it substantially
expand these efforts.  Specifically, the Department should
take immediate steps to expand the 1992 Philadelphia project
to the remaining nine regions.  The mix of cases should also
be enlarged to include a wider range of litigation,
especially ERISA, MSHA, LMRDA and OFFCP cases.
The Department should also explore the use of different
forms of ADR, including mini trials, early neutral
evaluation, and arbitration to determine which processes are
most effective for different kinds of cases.  The Commission
recommends that the Department take a more systematic
approach to ADR implementation.  To date, the efforts have
been relatively ad hoc, and experimentation has had to rely
on the support and knowledge of a few individuals.  Just in
the case of negotiated rulemaking, the techniques used in
ADR are substantive, and a cadre with expertise needs  to be
developed, maintained and promoted for all the regulatory
agencies in the Department.
The Department should work closely with the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) in developing the
necessary changes to the ADR Act, which sunsets in October
of 1995.  As an active participant in this government-wide
effort to improve the ADR  Act, the Department can both
provide leadership and potentially reap the benefits of an
improved statutory framework to allow for the use of a wider
range of ADR techniques.
(5)  Improve the Training of DOL  Employees in Dispute
Resolution
As noted earlier, the vast majority of cases that DOL
initiates as a result of an investigation that produces a
citation are resolved without litigation.  A significant
number of cases are resolved directly when the employer does
83
not contest the citation or fine.  Of those contested,
agency procedures typically seek to resolve the cases
without litigation.  Attempts to resolve a case are
typically made at the agency level and subsequently by the
Solicitor of Labor after the case has been referred for
legal action.  The Commission applauds the efforts by
agencies and SOL to achieve voluntary compliance or
 negotiated settlements without litigation.
A few years ago, the Congress significantly increased the
penalties that OSHA, MSHA and ESA could assess.  As these
agencies began assessing higher fines, the rate at which
firms contest these assessments has risen.  For example, for
more than a decade mine operators contested approximately
three percent of their citations.  Beginning in 1989, the
contest rate rose to its current level of ten percent.
Recently, MSHA and SOL instituted the Alternative Case
Resolution Initiative (ACRI) to help resolve disputes in
routine cases, both before and after contests are filed,
without formally referring these cases for legal action.
Eighteen representatives have been provided with special
training þ including administrative law and negotiating
skills þ by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS). Eventually, these representatives are expected to
handle approximately 20 percent of the contested MSHA cases.
The Commission believes that DOL employees who are charged
with case resolution should be provided formal training in
mediation and negotiating skills.  While some individuals
have acquired such skills on their own, or by being mentored
by someone already skilled in such techniques, few actually
have had training in these areas.  The Department would be
well served by ensuring that such employees receive
training, because this would lead to  more timely resolution
of cases and reduced litigation.  The Commission recommends
that DOL explore appropriate training plans.
(6)  Coordinations of DOL Procedures
The various employment statutes administered by the
Department were enacted and amended in piecemeal fashion
over the past 60 years.  For example, penalty structures
established at different times have not been reviewed to
determine whether they are equitable for comparable
violations of different laws.<Footnote: See particularly the
GAO Report Workplace Regulation, Vol. I, pp. 41-45>  More
importantly, the administration of these statutes has
resulted in the growth (most often by statute) of complex,
slow, and expensive  adjudicatory structures.  No
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comprehensive analysis has been done to determine the
effects of amendments to one labor standard on the enactment
or amendments to another.
For example, the penalty structures of OSHA and MSHA have
developed quite differently, notwithstanding the
similarities of many workplace safety issues.  The criteria
for debarment under the Service Contract Act differ
significantly from those under the Davis-Bacon Act,
notwithstanding  strong similarities in the objectives of
these government contract labor statutes.  Some of these
differences may be based on public policy considerations,
but many are the result of historical accident. Whatever the
reasons, such differing legal structures appear to add
complexity to their administration and contribute to
disputes.
Similarly, the adjudication process of the Department is in
need of review, streamlining and greater standardization.
The Department of Labor is relatively unique in that it
litigates the majority of its own civil cases, instead of
relying on the Department of Justice to handle such
litigation.  Again, due to the variety of statutory
constructs, cases are adjudicated in a variety of different
forums, including federal district courts, the Office of the
Administrative Law Judges, the OSHA and MSHA Review
Commissions, the Wage Appeals Board, and others.  As noted
above, the processes for litigating disputes are very
different, depending on the particular statute.  Some
processes appear unduly lengthy and complex, given the
amount and nature of the penalty.  The use of such different
forums and procedures is cumbersome for employers,
employees, and the Department, contributing to disputes
rooted in the administration of the law rather than the
merits of a case.
 5.  EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE  RESOLUTION
From its inception in 1964, the EEOC has engaged in
alternative dispute resolution.  In the beginning, the EEOC
had the authority only to conciliate all investigated
charges on which it found cause to believe discrimination
had occurred.  Even after Congress, in 1972, conferred
litigation authority on the EEOC, the EEOC was required to
attempt conciliation of all charges on which cause had been
found as a condition precedent to litigation.  To the extent
ADR is defined as a mechanism to resolve disputes short of
litigation, the EEOC, in engaging in conciliation, has
performed its law enforcement mission by utilizing, in part,
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ADR.
Formal conciliation under the Commission's statutory
procedure occurs after a charge has been investigated and a
cause determination issued.  The Commission recently decided
to experiment with pre-investigation ADR when it embarked
upon a one-year pilot project at four of its district
offices:  Philadelphia, Washington, New Orleans and Houston.
This ADR program, which was developed and conducted by the
Center for Dispute Settlement and Commission personnel,
involved voluntary mediation of certain subject matter
charges.
The pilot was completed in the Spring of 1994, and the
Center for Dispute Settlement issued its evaluation of the
program on December 1, 1994.  In the pilot project,
mediation was offered to 920 charging parties, of whom 87
percent accepted the offer.  Thirty-nine (39) percent of
respondent employers agreed to participate.  The four
district offices completed mediation of 267 charges;
settlements were reached in 139 of the cases (52 percent).
Smaller employers (15-100 employees) reached agreement in 60
percent of the cases, while large employers (500+ employees)
settled 38 percent of their cases..  The average time for
completion of the  mediation process was 67 days.  This
compares with 247 days under the standard investigatory
process.
A comparison of the ADR pilot project settlement with 251
settlements reached by the Commission under its regular
charge resolution techniques revealed no "major differences"
between the two, although monetory benefits tended to be
slightly higher under the agency's standard negotiated
settlement process.
In confidential exit evaluations, 92 percent of the parties
rated the mediation experience as "very fair" or "fair".
Eighty percent stated they would try mediation again if the
need arose.  This high degree of user satisfaction existed
even when settlement was not reached.
In December 1994, Chairman Gilbert F. Casellas announced the
formation of an Alternative Dispute Resolution Task Force,
co-chaired by Commissioners R. Gaull Silberman and Paul
Steven Miller, to recommend to the Commission appropriate
forms of ADR for Commission use.  The work of the Task Force
will be guided by two overreaching principles:  one, that
ASDR is a core element of the agency's mission to enforce
the civil rights laws of the United States; and two, that
ADR will not, in and of itself, solve the problem of the
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mounting number of cases with which the agency must deal.
Rather, ADR should be viewed as an integral part of the
Commission's case management system.
The Task Force recognizes that no one approach will suffice.
The final recommendation will take into account the need for
flexibility.  The Task Force anticipates developing a list
of EEOC-sanctioned projects and allowing the local offices
to choose those programs most appropriate to its needs and
caseload.
The Task Force plans to deliver its report to the Chairman
of the EEOC during the Spring of 1995.
 6.  LONG-TERM CODIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
Finally, there is a long-term need to review, codify and
consolidate employment law and its administration.  This is
a task beyond the assignment and capacity of the present
Commission.  The task needs to include experts drawn from
business, labor organizations, administrative agencies,
academic experts and the relevant committees of the
Congress.  For the same purposes, the relationship of
federal statutes and regulations to those of the states
needs to be considered.
87
VII. Safety and Health Programs and Employee Involvement
1.   GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The Fact Finding Report (pp. 22-23 and 121-23) reported that
America"s occupational safety and health record has not
improved (save for fatalities) with the result that work
injuries and illness are producing rising costs to workers,
enterprises and the economy.  At the same time joint safety
and health committees are the most common form of employee
participation program aimed at employee concerns about
conditions of work.  A 1993 National Safety Council Report
found that such joint committees exist in 75 percent of
establishments with 50 or more employees, and in 31 percent
with less than 50 employees.  Moreover, ten or so states now
require by law such a committee, or other forms of employee
involvement in this area.  The Report observed that in many
of these states the joint committees were legislated with
trade-offs involving other workers" compensation and
disability provisions.
Additional legislation and further studies have come to the
attention of the Commission.  At least three states
þCalifornia, Massachusetts and Florida þ have authorized
parties under collective bargaining agreements in the
construction industry to provide for a jointly agreed upon
panel of doctors and to provide for alternative dispute
resolution (arbitration) of disputes over the application of
workers" compensation benefits administered by state
agencies.<Footnote: Among studies, see Wayne Lewchuk, A.
Leslie Robb, and Vivienne Walters, The Effectiveness of
Joint safety and health Committees in Reducing Injuries and
Illness in the Workplace:  The Case of Ontario, July 1944,
(McMaster University, Canada).>
There is a wide consensus that the safety and health
performance of the American workplace can be substantially
improved with more management commitment and more worker
involvement.  But there has been little consensus as to how
best to achieve this common objective.  Further, there is
uncertainty in the business community, in nonunion
establishments, as well as in regulatory agencies, whether
safety and health committees or other forms of employee
involvement in such establishments are legal under Section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act.  (See Section
II of this Report.)
The Commission suggests that the following approach to
safety and health programs be implemented in appropriate
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regulatory or legislative language.
Employee participation and management commitment are
essential ingredients of a  successful workplace safety and
health program intended to identify, prevent and control
recognized hazards.  Every workplace should be required to
have a program for preventing accidents and illness.  The
nature of the program may be expected to vary by size and
type of workplace, the nature of the hazards and other
factors.
Experience has shown that there are certain basic
requirements that are present in any good safety and health
program regardless of size or type of workplace or nature of
the hazards.  The program should be stated in written form,
except that the smallest enterprises outside of those in
designated hazardous sectors, may be excused from the
written requirement.
The basic elements of a safety and health program are set
forth in 2 and 3 below:
2.   Program Elements
1.  Designation of responsibility
The personnel responsible for each aspect of the program
need to be clearly designated.
2.  Identification of hazards
The hazards currently or potentially existing in the
workplace can be identified from an examination of past
accidents or occupational illnesses, the accident history at
other similar facilities, employee suggestions or
complaints, the measurement of various exposure levels, and
from other sources.  A plan should be included to remedy
existing hazards that violate OSHA standards.
3.  Setting priorities
Once hazards are identified, priorities need to be
established so that resources can be assigned to the areas
of greatest need.  Nonconformance with federal and state
standards should be corrected.
4.  Safety rules and procedures
Based on hazards that have been identified and the controls
that are deemed to be necessary, specific rules should be
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developed governing the conduct of all personnel in the
workplace.
5.  Periodic internal inspection
A plan of periodic facility inspections should be developed.
The purposes of such periodic self-inspection should be made
clear þ such as, assuring safety rules are followed,
checking that preventive measures and devices are working
properly, or identifying new hazards.
6.  Accident  investigation
All lost-time accidents and "near misses" need to be
thoroughly investigated.  The primary purpose of the
investigation is to assure that reasonable measures are
taken to help prevent recurrence.
7.  Safety and health training and communications
Safety and health training should be provided to all
personnel, including supervisors and managers, at the time
of hire and at least annually thereafter.  It is vital that
a procedure be established for regular communication of
safety-related information to all personnel.
8.  Accident  recordkeeping
A process for recordkeeping that conforms with state and
federal requirements should be in place.  All accidents and
occupational illnesses should be recorded.  Periodic
statistical analysis should determine the most prevalent
sources of accidents and illness; this information should be
made available to all personnel.
9.  First aid and medical care
Procedures should be developed for assuring that proper
medical care is provided to any injured or ill employee.
10. Emergency preparedness care
Plans are required to protect personnel in the event of
emergencies such as fire, earthquake, leakage of toxic
material, etc.  Plans include provisions for employee
personal protection, life safety, orderly evacuation, etc.
3.   Employee Involvement
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 Experience has shown that a further basic requirement of
any good safety and health program regardless of size or
type of workplace is to ensure employee participation in the
design and operation of the program.  The plan may involve a
number of different structures for achieving employee
participationþfor instance, a safety committee, designation
of key employees for various functions, ad hoc working
groups, or assignments within teams.
Employee participation means that employees are encouraged
to participate fully in the program, including the review
and investigation of injuries and illnesses; periodic
workplace inspections and regular safety and health
meetings; and recommendations to the employer with respect
to the administration of the program elements.
Effective employee involvement includes the right of
employees to seek outside opinion and information on safety
and health  questions related to the workplace.  In
accordance with the statute, workers are assured that they
are not to be penalized for exercising their rights under
workplace safety and health programs.
(1)  In the workplaces governed by collective bargaining
agreements, the safety and health  program and forms of
employee participation are to be worked out by the parties
to the agreement or their designees at the workplace.
(2)  In workplaces without collective bargaining, the safety
and health program, including the Program Elements
identified in section 2 above and the form of worker
selection in the design and administration of the program,
should be developed by management in full consultation with
the employees.
The Commission is advised that OSHA is in the process of
developing a workplace safety and health program standard,
not unlike the basic elements of the safety and health
program outlined in section 2 above.  The Commission is
supportive of this effort and urges OSHA to seek the
broadest possible consensus from employer and employee
organizations.
The Commission suggests that OSHA explore, in consultation
with employer and employee organizations, the use of
appropriate third party organizations such as some casualty
insurance companies, professional organizations of safety
engineers, industrial hygienists, or other groups with
special expertise and capabilities in safety and health.
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These bodies could advise and verify as to an appropriate
degree of employee involvement in the program design and
administration of the safety and health program at a
workplace.
In situations in which OSHA is satisfied, with the
assistance of such outside expert judgment, that there is
substantial worker participation in the design and
administration of the safety and health program, and that it
has a good record of performance, we encourage the agency to
provide appropriate forms of preferential status in the
inspections and administration of standards as it has done
in some programs, such as by a secondary inspection list,
penalty reduction, and limited inspection except with regard
to principal hazards in the type of workplace.
The Commission believes that such incentives and
encouragement of effective employee involvement in safety
and health programs with a record of effective performance
would significantly promote an internal responsibility
system for safety and health in the  workplace, reduce costs
and promote productivity.<Footnote: With respect to the
status of safety and health employee involvement plans under
the National Labor Relations Act, the recommendations set
forth in Section II of this Report provide the applicable
principles.  The Commission has sought to clarify in Section
V(6) the responsibility for safety and health in cases
involving client-contractor relationships
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VIII.  Railway Labor Act
The Fact Finding Report (pp. 98-103) concluded, on the basis
of the October 20, 1993 hearing and subsequent statements to
the Commission, that there have been significant changes in
the railroad and airline sectors since the 1926 Railway
Labor Act was made law and extended to airlines in 1936.
 Both industries are now substantially governed by
collective bargaining agreements. Both industries have been
substantially deregulated as to rates and fares.  Airline
employment has continued to expand while railroad carriers
have consolidated and had declines in employment.  Coverage
under the Act, once of no legal moment, is now a contested
issue.  A number of problems were identified, including:
 the inordinate time required to resolve major and minor
disputes; the scope of coverage under the Act; the impact of
the class and craft units on smaller carriers; the overall
operations of the grievance procedures; and the use of
mediation in major disputes.  In addition, Congressional
Representatives reported to the Commission their
dissatisfaction with having to interfere with complex labor-
management disputes on short notice.
After the issuance of the Fact Finding Report, a working
party of the Commission met with representatives of both the
airline and railroad industries, jointly and separately, to
receive their reactions to the Fact Finding Report and their
responses to the questions the Commission posed.  The
Commission explored with the parties a variety of potential
recommendations ranging from legislation to change the Act's
jurisdiction, to revision of the class and craft units, to
strict time limits for processing major disputes.  Other
parties presented their comments in writing.
Despite differences of interest and experience, the  major
representatives of labor and management governed by the
Railway Labor Act responded unanimously that this Commission
should not recommend any changes to the Act.
This unified reaction from the parties results not from a
failure to recognize their problems, but rather, from a
common concern as to the solution to those problems.  Unlike
the National Labor Relations Act, which was enacted through
substantial labor-management and political conflict, the
1926 Railway Labor Act was made law with the full agreement
of railroad labor and management, and later amended to
include the airline industry after discussion with the
parties.  These parties regard the Railway Labor Act as
their creation, achieved through a bi-partite process, and
93
they are justly proud of their role in the enactment of the
statute.  They wish to preserve and improve the processes
under the Act through joint discussion and negotiations,
rather than to have solutions imposed upon them by third
parties.
Based on this history, the parties have convinced the
Commission that it should issue no specific recommendations
for legislative change at this time.  Instead, the parties
should be permitted jointly to seek their own solutions to
make collective bargaining operate more effectively.  In
adopting the parties' requests, the Commission directs and
expects them to proceed as follows:
The parties shall commit to a series of conferences and
meetings designed to seek consensus and agreement on changes
to the Act and/or changes in the National Mediation Board's
procedures, as well as their own approaches to bargaining
dispute resolution.
The Commission recommends that these meetings be organized
through two Committees, one made up of representatives of
the railroads and their labor organizations, and one made up
of representatives of the airlines and their labor
organizations.  The Chairperson of each  Committee shall be
an experienced neutral recommended by the Secretary of Labor
from a pool of neutrals suggested by the National Mediation
Board, and agreed to by the parties.  In addition to
chairing  and facilitating the meetings, the Chairpersons
will act as intermediaries between the Committees and the
Secretary of Labor and the National Mediation Board.  To
assist this process, the Secretary of Labor and National
Mediation Board should provide the necessary support.  If
needed, the Committees may also seek mediation from the
National Mediation Board or some other neutral.
The Committees are expected to make specific recommendations
for change which would improve the processes and performance
of collective bargaining in the resolution of "major" and
"minor" disputes.  The recommendations may call for
legislation, rule making or other action by the National
Mediation Board and/or the parties.  The recommendations
should address, in addition to whatever other issues the
Committees deem appropriate, the following issues:
What changes are needed to shorten the time periods for
resolving major disputes?
What steps are needed to encourage or compel the parties to
resolve these disputes through negotiation (including
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mediation), rather than self-help or Congressional action?
What changes are needed to resolve the Railway Labor Act
jurisdictional issues raised by including one entity while
excluding another entity which is engaged in a similar
business?
What changes are needed to avoid the growing trend of
litigation over what constitutes "major" and "minor"
disputes?
 How can the Act be made less burdensome on the short line
and commuter railroads, and the commuter airlines, i.e.,
through redefining jurisdiction or changing unit composition
for these smaller carriers?
What steps are necessary to decrease the number of minor
disputes that go to arbitration and/or shorten the grievance
and arbitration process?
By March 31, 1996, each Committee should issue its
recommendations in a report to the National Mediation Board.
The National Mediation Board will then issue a report  (a)
concurring or objecting to the recommendations, and (b)
indicating what relevant changes the National Mediation
Board  had implemented or planned to implement.  Both
reports will be forwarded to the Secretary of Labor no later
than 60 days after being received by the NMB for any further
action deemed appropriate.
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IX. The Future of the American Workforce
 1.  NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  FORUMS
The Commission recommends the creation of a private-public
forum for continuing discourse on issues of national concern
related to the Future of the American Workforce and within
that forum a separate national Labor-Management Committee
treating labor-management and workplace issues.
The Forum
The Forum shall be comprised of representatives drawn from
business, labor organizations, women's groups and civil
rights organizations and the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government.  This forum may hold
public meetings and public hearings, or it may meet for
discourse in private.
Among the issues suggested for the Forum are the following:
 the growing disparity in income in the workforce including
the status of low-wage workers and their families, the
interests of working women, government regulations of the
workplace; impacts of the global economy; and job creation.
Labor-Management Committee
A separate labor-management committee comprised of business
and labor organization; members of the Forum, with
government representatives to be determined, shall meet
periodically and autonomously to consider issues of employee
involvement, cooperation and performance at the workplace,
health and safety, conflict and dispute resolution, training
measures and other issues of mutual concern.
The Forum and the Labor-Management Committee are authorized
to make recommendations as to private policies, executive
action or legislative proposals.   The discussion of those
two groups should be informed by the results of studies
prepared by the public-private research group described in
Section IX.2.
Similar forums and labor-management committees may be
established in localities or sectors of industry.
2.   LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
The country is in the process of developing and
experimenting with a number of features of the workplace in
many enterprises.  The Commission's suggestions and
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recommendation propose additional changes and new
directions.  It is essential to learn more systematically
than we have to date the ongoing experimentation for future
private and public policy making.  The process of
understanding and appraising the outcomes of new experiences
is vital in view of the wide diversity among the nation's
seven million workplaces.  The innovations occurring at the
workplace level need to inform systematically the policy
making process at the national level.
Accordingly, the Commission proposes the creation of a
coordinated public-private research group to report and
analyze these developments.  There are a large number of
non-profit research institutions, some with business
support, some with labor support, some in government and
others among academic institutions that provide research
results and papers on aspects of the changing workplace.   A
coordination board with some government funding might well
develop more systematic basic data collection and reports on
a continuing basis with a much higher degree of acceptance
of the published results, with much less duplication,  and a
higher degree of professional competence.
The Labor-Management Committee and the Forum, proposed in
Section IX.1, should suggest topics for study for the
public-private research group and receive reports of its
work for purposes of private and public policy discussion.
Among the priority areas of study, research and evaluation
are the following:
1.  The employment experience of various categories of
contingent workers.
2.  Representation elections and initial contract
negotiations.
3. The processes and results of various types of employee
participation plans and labor-management partnerships.
5.  The views of workers and supervisors as to various
issues of worker representation and participation and their
attitudes at the workplace.
6.  The effects of workplace practices on American families.
7.  The effects of different types of workplace training.
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8.  The results of various forms of health and safety and
related employee involvement programs at the workplace.
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Appendix A:  The  Worker Representation and Participation
Survey
The Worker Representation and Participation Survey is a
national survey of American employees, directed by Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers and conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates in the fall of 1994.<Footnote: This
study was funded by private foundations and received
technical assistance from members of the business and labor
communities.>
This study is a detailed and in-depth analysis of workplace
practices and of the attitudes and views of workers on
workplace issues.<Footnote: Where questions overlap, the
Worker Representation and Participation Survey findings are
consistent with those of earlier surveys, such as the 1976
Quality of Employment Survey sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Labor conducted by the University of Michigan;
the Penn and Shoen survey conducted by the LPA; the Harris
Poll conducted for the AFL-CIO; Industrial Relations
Counselors, Inc., Report on the IRC Survey of Employee
Involvement, August 1994, among others. >  It presents the
views of a representative sample of over 2,400 employees in
privately owned firms with greater than 25 workers.  It
identifies separately workers and supervisors, current union
members, prior members and non-members, as well as the
diverse demographic groups that make up the American
workforce.  The survey questions were prepared through
consultation with staff of managements and unions
experienced in survey work and included variations in
wording to minimize the possible dependence of responses on
the precise way a question was phrased.  While there have
been several opinion polls of employees in the past, and
while some management organizations and some unions
regularly survey their employees or members, in the
Commission's view this survey provides the best current
indicator of how American employees see some of the
workplace issues facing the country.  As a representative
sample, the views expressed do not, of course, characterize
any particular workplace or workforce.  Future studies and
analyses may be expected to perfect this information.
The major findings of the Survey may be briefly summarized
in the following single paragraph:
American workers want more involvement and greater say in
their jobs, they would like this involvement to take the
form of joint committees with management and would prefer to
elect members of those committees rather than have managers
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select them.  They prefer cooperative committees to
potentially conflictual organized relationships.  A sizable
minority are in workplaces where they and their fellow
workers want to be represented by unions or union-like
organizations.
  Some of the more detailed responses to the Survey are
summarized below:
(1)  The new forms of work and work relations about which
the Commission heard considerable testimony are part of the
working lives of many American employees. The distinction
between supervisors and non-supervisors is eroding:  35
percent of non-managers report supervising others as part of
their official job.  Nearly a quarter of the workers view
their jobs  as something they would probably leave, rather
than as part of a career; and only one-third were confident
they could quickly get another job at about the same pay,
without having to move.  One-third (32 percent) of employees
report being involved with self-directed work teams, total
quality management, quality circles or other forms of
employee involvement programs, and over half report such
programs existing at their firms.
(2)  A substantial number of employees are unhappy about
their work lives and workplaces.  While two-thirds of all
workers report that they look forward to going to work on
the average day, 33 percent do not look forward to work.
 One-fourth say they -wish (they) didn’t have to go" to work
and another eight percent don’t care one way or the other
about their job.  Among workers making $200 - $399 a week,
the percent dissatisfied reaches 41 percent; among black
workers, 42 percent.  Similarly, just 18 percent report that
employee-management relations are excellent at their
workplace; 49 percent report that relations are good; and
nearly a third report relations to be only fair (22 percent)
or poor (10 percent).  Again, the proportion reporting only
fair or poor relations is higher among the low paid and
among minorities.  Five percent reported going to court or a
government agency for a violation of their workplace rights,
while another nine percent report having thought about going
to court or to an agency but having decided not to do so.
(3)  Workers generally report feeling loyal to their
company, but perceive a lack of company loyalty to them.
 Among all employees, 64 percent report feeling a -lot of
loyalty toward their company, but only 38 percent trust
their company a lot -to keep its promises to them.  Across
non-managerial employees þ supervisory and non-supervisory þ
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high loyalty to the company averaged 53 percent, high trust
was 35 percent.  Among managers 24 percent reported trusting
their company -only a little or -not at all, even higher
than the 19 percent of non-supervisory employees that
provided the same response.
(4)  Most employees want more influence or decision-making
power in their job, and believe this would improve company
productivity as well as their working lives. Sixty-three
percent of employees said they wanted more influence,
compared to 35 percent who were content with things as they
were.  Among the areas in which employees said they wanted
 more influence were:   deciding what kinds  of benefits are
offered, awarding raises for those in the work group,
deciding what training is needed.
(5)  Workers generally have favorable attitudes toward
employee involvement plans, but believe the plans would be
better if rank and file employees had more power in them.
Thirty-one percent of workers who participate in programs
viewed them as very effective, 55 percent as somewhat
effective, and 11 percent as not too effective.  In the
majority of programs, management recruits participants by
asking for volunteers (47 percent) or simply picking people
(27 percent), rather than by having employees elect or
otherwise select their peers.  The vast majority of
employees (82 percent) believe that -if employees, as a
group, had more say in how these programs are run they
would be more effective than at present.
(6)  Many employees would prefer raising problems with their
employers as part of a group and most believe that workplace
problems could be resolved better if employees had a greater
say in their resolution.  Between 43 and 57 percent of
employees (the proportion varies with the wording of the
question) say they would feel more comfortable raising work
problems through an employee association or with the help of
fellow employees, rather than as an individual.  Seventy-six
percent believe that if employees had more say in resolving
workplace problems, their company’s system would be more
effective than at present.
(7)  Some 71 percent of current union members report their
experience with the organization as  -good or -very good;
only seven percent consider it bad; and 90 percent would
vote to keep the union in a new representation election.
Among former union members, however, feelings are less
positive, with 24 percent ranking the experience as bad.
 One-third (32 percent) of nonunion employees say they would
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vote for a union today, while 55 percent of nonunion
employees say that they would vote against a union, and 13
percent were undecided.  In workplaces where employees
believe management opposes unions, twelve percent of
nonunion workers who say they are against a union drive
report that they would change their vote if management did
not oppose the union; in nonunion workplaces where employees
believe management does not oppose the union; eight percent
of union supporters said they would vote against the union
if management opposed the union.
(8)  Managers in unionized workplaces have ambivalent
attitudes toward unions.  By a two to one margin (32 percent
versus 16 percent), managers in unionized workplaces report
that in recent years unions have become more cooperative
rather than more confrontational, and 69 percent report that
the company accepts the union as a partner.  Twenty-seven
percent of managers believe that unions help the companies
performance, while 38 percent believe that they hurt the
company’s performance.  Two-thirds (64 percent) believe
unions help their members.  Among managers in nonunion
workplaces, 53 percent of nonunion managers report that they
would oppose a union drive at their facility; 32 percent
report that it would hurt their career advancement if the
employees they manage successfully formed a union.
(9)  Asked about the sort of workplace organization they
would like to have, employee’s voice fairly clear preferences
for joint committees that would work cooperatively with
management, but which have some independence from
management, through, among other things, employee election
of members and outside referees to resolve disagreements.
But employees want any organization to enjoy cooperative
relations with management.  They prefer (52-34 percent) an
organization drawing on company budget and staff to one
relying only on its own budget and staff, and almost
universally (86-9 percent) prefer an organization -run
jointly by employees and management to one run by -
employees alone.<Footnote: The Commission observes that
unilateral reductions in wages or benefits, or increases in
work assignments or discharges and layoffs deemed unfair by
workers have on occasions historically changed preferences
for employee organizations rapidly and precipitated a
union.>
(10) The vast majority of workers believe that the key to a
successful workplace organization is management cooperation
with the organization; by 78-17 percent, employees believe -
employee organization ... can only be effective if
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management cooperates" with them.  The interest in
management cooperation dominates preferences on
organizational form. Asked to choose between an employee
organization that management cooperated with in discussing
issues, but had no power to make decisions"; and one -that
had more power, but management opposed, 63 percent of
employees prefer the weak organization to the strong.  For
their part, 36 percent of managers report that they
definitely would be willing to work with an employee
organization to solve workplace problems, while 47 percent
report they probably would be willing to do so.
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Appendix B: National Meetings - Washington, D.C.
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W. J. Usery, Jr.
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FOCUS :    Appropriate Coverage Regarding:
1) Contingent Workers and the
Dividing Line Between Employee and
Independent Contractor  and
2) The Proper Scope of Exclusion of






American Federation of Labor and








Service Employees International Union
Kim A. Roberts,
Counsel, Assistant National Director
American Federation of Television
and Radio  Artists
Virginia L. duRivage,
Research Fellow, Institute for the
Study of Labor  Organizations
George Meany Center for Labor Studies
Views of Management
Thomas B. Moorhead
Vice President, Human Resources
Carter-Wallace, Inc.
Mitchell S. Fromstein




Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewartt
Pay Equity and Related Issues
Susan Bianchi-Sand
Executive Director
National Committee on Pay Equity
Audrey Tayse Haynes
Executive Director
Business and Professional Woman/USA
Cindy Morano
Executive Director




Dr. Lenora Cole Alexander
Board Member









Construction Industry Labor- Management Trust Fund
National Alliance for Fair Contracting
Laurence E. Norton, II
Central Pennsylvania Legal Services
Representing:
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Farmworker Division
Harvey Shulman
General Counsel
National Association of Computer Consultant Businesses
AUGUST 10, 1994







Vice President, Human Resources
Merck & Company, Inc.
Rosemary Collyer
Partner
Crowell & Moring and Former General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
Accompanied by:
Charles F. Nielson

























Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and  Innovation, Inc.
Dr. James E. Perley
President




American Association of University Professors
SEPTEMBER 8, 1994
























Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather  & Geraldson,
and Former Chairman
National Labor Relations Board
Andrew M. Kramer
Partner
Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue
Amy Isaacs
National Director
Americans for Democratic Action
On behalf of:
U.S. Representative John Lewis, (D GA)
for the Citizens Committee on Employee Rights
Lewis Maltby
Director
National Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace
American Civil Liberties Union
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Monsignor George G. Higgins
Department of Theology
Catholic University of America
Former Director, Special Research Office
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
ADDITIONAL PRESENTATIONS
Dr. Herbert R. Northrup
Professor Emeritus of Management






Smith, Heenan and Althen
On behalf of:
The Free Work Place Alliance
SEPTEMBER 29, 1994





















Lawrence Z. Lorber, Esq.
Partner, Lipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand
On behalf of:


























Friends of Farmworkers, Inc.
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PRESENTATIONS
William B. Gould IV
Chairman
National Labor Relations Board
Frederick L. Feinstein
General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
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Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
APPOINTED BY:
Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich




John T. Dunlop, Chairman
Former Secretary of Labor (1975-1976)
Lamont University Professor Emeritus
Harvard University
Douglas A. Fraser
Former President, United Auto Workers
Professor of Labor Studies
Wayne State University
Richard B. Freeman
Herbert Ascherman Professor of Economics
Harvard University Program
Director for Labor Studies
National Bureau of Economic Research.




Former Secretary of Labor (1976-1981)
Audre and Bernard Rapoport
Centennial Chair in Economics and Public Affairs
L.B.J. School of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin
Thomas A. Kochan
George M. Bunker Professor of Management
and Leaders for Manufacturing
Professor Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Juanita M. Kreps
Former Secretary of Commerce (1977-1979)






 W. J. Usery
 Former Secretary of Labor (1976-1977)
 President Bill Usery Associates, Inc.
Paula B.Voos
Professor of Economics and  Industrial Relations
University of Wisconsin
Paul C. Weiler
Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law
Harvard University
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CHART:  DOL/EEOC/NLRB Investigative Staff
                                     1980       1990      1994
DOL
     OSHA . . . . . . . . .  1,388.      1,271. . 1,128
     MSHA . . . . . . . . .  1,522.     1,080. . 1,128
     Wage & Hour. . .  . 1,098.        961. .   727
     OFCCP. . . . . . . . .    780.         564. .   488
     PWBP . . . . . . . . .     235.         320. .   322
     OLMS . . . . . . . . .       --           294. .   249
EEOC. . . . . . . . . . . .     892.         762. .   732
NLRB. . . . . . . . . . . .  1,122          833. .   783
NOTE:
The agencies represented in this table are the National Labor
Relations Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
the following agencies of the Department of Labor:  Occupational
Safety and Health Administration; Mine Safety and Health
Administration; the Employment Standards Administration's Wage and
Hour Division and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs;
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration; and Office of Labor-
Management Standards.
The table reports each agency's level of professional staffing in
full-time equivalents (FTEs) by fiscal year (FY).  Data for 1980
represent the best estimates of FTEs (rather than actual FTE
figures) for some agencies because the government did not use FTEs
as a standard measure until 1982.
The workloads of the agencies reported generally increased during
this period, even as staffing levels declines.  For example, at
the NLRB a drop in election cases was more than offset by a rise
in unfair labor practice (ULP) cases, which are more labor
intensive.  The Board reports that there were 4794 ULP
"situations" pending preliminary investigation at the end of FY
1994 compared with 3673 at the end of FY 1980, a rise of 31
percent.
